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ARTICLES 
REMOVAL AS A POLITICAL QUESTION 
Aziz Z. Huq* 
When should courts be responsible for designing federal administrative 
agencies? In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, the Supreme Court invalidated one specific mechanism that Congress em-
ploys to insulate agencies from presidential control. Lower federal courts have 
discerned wider implications in the decision’s linkage of presidential power to 
remove agency officials with democratic accountability. Applied robustly, the 
Free Enterprise Fund principle casts doubt on many agencies’ organic statutes. 
As the judiciary starts exploring those implications, this Article evaluates the ef-
fects of judicial intervention in administrative agency design in light of recent po-
litical science work on bureaucratic behavior, historical studies of state develop-
ment, and comparative analyses of other countries’ civil services. Judicial 
intervention in agency design, I conclude, will not generate consistent and pre-
dictable outcomes and instead risks diluting majoritarian control and fostering 
policy uncertainty. In light of the tenuous correlation between changes in presi-
dential removal power and the underlying constitutional good of democratic ac-
countability, I argue, removal power questions should be ranked as “political 
questions” beyond federal court competence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Until now, federal courts have played only a small role in elementary de-
sign decisions about the regulatory state. Instead, the political branches select 
policies, while agencies created by the political branches interpret and enforce 
those policies on the ground.1 Courts, to be sure, play a supporting part policing 
the use of delegated authority,2 but their influence on the administrative state’s 
basic architecture has to date been minimal.3 
Suddenly, the status quo is in doubt. A recent Supreme Court decision por-
tends a larger judicial role in drawing up blueprints for federal agencies. The 
holding of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board4 is modest. But it rests on an underlying principle with wider potential 
 
 1. Compare Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of 
Structure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11-15 (1994) (describing presidential incentives to 
influence bureaucratic structure), with Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 
VA. L. REV. 431 (1989) (exploring congressional strategies for influencing administrative 
policy outcomes by exercising control over agency structures).  
 2. By, for example, enforcing procedural requirements pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-52, 702, 704 (2011). 
 3. For example, under longstanding precedent, federal courts lack power to impose 
procedural rules on agencies. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (“Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling 
circumstances the administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of 
procedure . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). An agency is also free to choose 
between rulemaking and adjudication as its form of policymaking. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947). 
 4. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
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implications. In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court invalidated a single provision 
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.5 Among other reforms, the Act created the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to protect investors by 
supervising the audits of public companies.6 The challenged provisions serious-
ly restricted the President’s authority to remove PCAOB members.7 In the 
Court’s view, the Act permitted removal of PCAOB members only by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and then only on a showing of good 
cause; SEC commissioners also could be removed only on a showing of good 
cause by the White House.8 This “dual for-cause” regime created a buffer be-
tween the PCAOB and the President that, the Court held, conflicted with the 
promise of democratic accountability immanent in Article II of the Constitu-
tion.9 This specific holding rested on a more general syllogism. First, the Court 
held that power to remove a bureaucrat was essential to establish control over 
that official’s policy decisions.10 Second, the Court reasoned that absent presi-
dential control, the democratic accountability demanded by Article II would be 
wanting.11 Based on these two premises, the Court concludes that Article II en-
tails a quantum of presidential removal authority respecting agency officials in 
order to preserve democratic accountability.  
If this principle could easily be cabined to the “dual for-cause” regime at 
issue in Free Enterprise Fund, it would warrant only passing attention.12 But 
big things often have small beginnings. The Free Enterprise Fund principle 
cannot easily be limited to “dual for-cause” regimes. Rather, the decision’s 
fundamental logic “calls into question the constitutionality of hundreds of other 
governmental positions” buffered from presidential control,13 even those 
 
 5. See id. at 3151. 
 6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2011). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(6), 7219(d)(3). 
 8. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147. 
 9. Id. at 3151-55 (discussing the President’s authority to exercise control over those 
who execute laws); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America.”). 
 10. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154 (identifying as a constitutional flaw the fact 
that “[n]either the President, nor anyone directly responsible to him, nor even an officer 
whose conduct he may review only for good cause, has full control over the Board”). 
 11. Id. at 3164 (“The Constitution that makes the President accountable to the people 
for executing the laws also gives him the power to do so. That power includes, as a general 
matter, the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties.”). 
 12. The Court invalidated the Board’s tenure rules without changing its substantive 
powers. See id. at 3161 (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act remains fully operative as a law . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 13. Tom Goldstein & Amy Howe, But How Will the People Know? Public Opinion as 
a Meager Influence in Shaping Contemporary Supreme Court Decision Making, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 963, 969 (2011) (book review); see also Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing 
Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2541 
(2011) (“[T]he structure of the [Free Enterprise Fund] Court’s argument, which focuses on 
the importance of presidential control and accountability through the removal power, 
logically calls into question the constitutionality of agency independence.”). 
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positions protected by only a single layer of for-cause removal limitations. The 
opinion thereby invites judges to hunt through the U.S. Code, striking out  
tenure protection rules.14 Hence, the limited scope of short-run consequences 
from Free Enterprise Fund for the PCAOB itself belies a more important long-
term ramification: dramatic enlargement of judicial authority to dictate elemen-
tary parameters of agency design.  
This is no idle hypothesis. In July 2011, Judge Brett Kavanaugh of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals published a striking concurrence ar-
guing forcefully that Free Enterprise Fund impugned the constitutionality not 
only of dual for-cause rules, but also of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and all other “independent agenc[ies] that operate[] free of presidential direc-
tion and supervision.”15 The latter are typically insulated from the White 
House’s influence by single for-cause rules.16 They are “specifically designed 
not to have the quality . . . of being subject to the exercise of political  
 
 14. Even read modestly, Free Enterprise Fund applies to other entities with dual for-
cause protection. As Justice Breyer explained in dissent, this might encompass a large range 
of federal bodies. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3177-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Or it 
might not, depending on how many exceptions the Court carves out of the rule of decision 
employed in Free Enterprise Fund. The net result, in either case, is to vest large discretion in 
the Court’s hands.  
 15. In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 439-46 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring).  
 16. Both Congress and the executive use the term “independent agency” to refer to an 
agency when its head may be removed by the President only in defined and limited 
circumstances. For example, the head of the Social Security Administration (SSA) is only 
removable for cause, see 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (2011), and the SSA is denominated by its 
organic act as “an independent agency,” id. § 901. For a similar presidential usage, see, for 
example, Presidential Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 
4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) (using the term in that sense). The Government also uses the term to 
describe multimember commissions and boards in addition to agencies headed by a single 
person. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTRAR, NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2011, at 76, 245, 311 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GOVMAN-2011-10-05/pdf/GOVMAN-2011-10-05.pdf 
(labeling the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and 
the Administrative Conference of the United States as independent). In the academic 
literature, however, there is more awareness that agencies’ independence from “political 
will” can be secured through other structural features, such as multimember composition and 
bipartisanship requirements. See generally Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established 
by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1111, 1113, 1135-55 (2000) (cataloging five different elements that influence the 
independence of modern agencies, including appointments, removal (including tenure rules), 
organizational structure, congressional oversight, and litigation authority). In an important 
forthcoming article, Adrian Vermeule defines agency independence in terms of conventions, 
or “extrajudicial unwritten norms that are enforced by the threat of political sanctions.” 
Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013) (manuscript at 14), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2103338.  
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oversight.”17 A glitch in the Article III case-or-controversy requirements in the 
case in question precluded Judge Kavanaugh from pressing his argument.18 But 
it is only a matter of time before an appropriate lawsuit raises the question of 
how far Free Enterprise Fund goes in shifting agency design authority to fed-
eral courts.19  
In this Article, I focus on the broad reading of Free Enterprise Fund es-
poused by Judge Kavanaugh in order to investigate how authority to design 
agencies should be apportioned between the political branches and the judici-
ary. Assuming that Article II of the Constitution requires democratic accounta-
bility over agency actions, I ask, which branch bears responsibility for execut-
ing that mandate at the agency design stage through the regulation of removal 
authority? To investigate the viability of judicial supervision of agency design, 
the Article draws on the doctrinal framework of the “political question” doc-
trine. This is a tool for sorting constitutional disputes between the judiciary and 
the political branches.20 To that end, the Court has employed a range of tests to 
sort constitutional questions based on their amenability for judicial resolution. 
Most relevant here is the Court’s development of the political question doc-
trine, which, among its many applications, identifies the absence of a judicially 
manageable standard as a reason for treating a legal issue as nonjusticiable.21 
The Supreme Court has not been as clear as might be desirable about the neces-
sary prerequisites of a judicially manageable standard. For the purposes of this 
Article, I proffer a relatively minimal and parsimonious test for discerning ade-
quate rules of decision: will judicial enforcement of a rule promote the underly-
ing constitutional values or goods that justify the rule in the first instance? If 
there is no reliable and stable correlation between a rule of decision and those 
underlying values, and if the results of a rule’s application are instead ad hoc 
and unpredictable, then the Court has failed to identify a judicially manageable 
standard. In the absence of a plausible alternative doctrinal framework, courts 
should refrain from acting, with the resolution of a constitutional issue typically 
redounding to the political branches.  
The central claim of this Article is that the rule of decision articulated in 
Free Enterprise Fund concerning presidential removal authority fails this test. 
It is not a judicially manageable standard because it does not reliably produce 
 
 17. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 916 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) 
(internal quotation mark omitted); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133 (1976) (per 
curiam) (emphasizing that “members of such agencies were to be independent of the 
Executive in their day-to-day operations”). 
 18. See In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d at 438 (dismissing the case for lack of 
jurisdiction). 
 19. For a discussion of a case filed in June 2012 that seeks to expand Free Enterprise 
Fund, see infra text accompanying notes 103-105. 
 20. See infra Part I.C. 
 21. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). For an account of the political 
question doctrine, see generally Part I.C, below.  
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the constitutional good identified by the Court—democratic accountability. 
Drawing on a range of empirical and theoretical work in political science and 
institutional psychology, I aim to demonstrate why judicial enforcement of 
presidential removal authority will not reliably promote presidential control or 
democratic accountability. To that end, the Article decomposes the logic of 
Free Enterprise Fund into its two interlocking causal theses—the link between 
presidential removal authority and control, and the link between presidential 
control and democratic accountability—and analyzes them separately. For the 
Court’s proposed rule to be judicially manageable, it must be the case that both 
premises of the syllogism employed in Free Enterprise Fund hold true. 
Neither of the two causal connections necessary to link presidential remov-
al authority with the constitutional good of democratic accountability, however, 
withstands close scrutiny. Roughly speaking, both fail because both ignore in-
teractions with other design options and the strategic responses of other gov-
ernment actors. With respect to the first link in the Free Enterprise Fund causal 
claim, I argue that there is no strong correlation between removal authority and 
political control.22 Empirical evidence and political science models instead 
show that the power to remove is sometimes unnecessary and sometimes inef-
fectual to the goal of political control of the bureaucracy. Worse, presidential 
removal authority often has perverse and undesirable effects quite apart from 
democratic accountability goals. As a result, Presidents have tended not to rely 
too heavily upon the removal power to secure control over bureaucratic subor-
dinates, and have instead looked to other tools. Turning to the second compo-
nent of the Court’s causal argument, there is no stable positive correlation be-
tween presidential control and democratic accountability. Instead, judicial 
promotion of presidential control will sometimes have the paradoxical conse-
quence of diminishing net democratic accountability.  
Taken together, these critiques undermine the putative correlation between 
presidential removal authority and democratic accountability. Judicial interven-
tions in favor of presidential removal authority can therefore either promote or 
retard, or even leave untouched, net democratic accountability. Courts simply 
have no way of knowing in advance what effect their intervention will have on 
the relevant constitutional good. In the argot of the political question doctrine, 
this means that the promotion of presidential removal authority is not a judicial-
ly manageable standard by which a constitutional value can be reliably 
achieved.  
This Article concerns justiciability and takes no position on the underlying 
questions whether Presidents should have broad removal authority for any giv-
en agency, or whether there should be exceptions to allow, say, adjudicative 
autonomy or central bank independence. Indeed, assignment to the political 
branches of decisions concerning removal does not mean that either the  
 
 22. By “political control,” I mean control by an official responsible to the public 
through periodic elections. 
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President or Congress will have free rein. Political control of the removal pow-
er question leaves the matter subject to interbranch negotiation and compromise 
by elected officials who are more attuned than judges to the complex interac-
tion effects and strategic responses that can arise in response to changes in 
basic agency design. 
To focus on justiciability in this fashion is to address a topic largely ig-
nored in the oceanic literature on the removal power, a literature replete with 
relentless Ahabs and elusive white whales. There has long been lively contro-
versy as to whether Article II of the Constitution vests Presidents with plenary 
authority to control officials who execute the laws in some fashion. Some 
scholars argue implacably for plenary presidential removal power.23 Others 
take positions in defense of Congress’s authority to take part in defining agency 
structures.24 Resolution of the debate eludes the academy. But dueling scholars 
have taken for granted the suitability of removal power questions for federal 
court adjudication. Justiciability remains a matter of assumption, not proof. To 
be sure, two distinguished voices have counseled against judicial resolution of 
this structural constitutional issue.25 But their categorical arguments rely on 
 
 23. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 598 (1994) (“If the President is to have effective 
control of his constitutionally granted powers, he must be able to remove those who he 
believes will not follow his administrative agenda and philosophy.”); Steven G. Calabresi & 
Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1167-68 (1992) (noting that unitary executive theorists, who believe 
that the Constitution envisions broad presidential power over administrative agencies, read 
the text of the Vesting Clause to give the President a substantive grant of power); Lawrence 
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
102-03 (1994) (making a similar claim on functionalist grounds); see also Saikrishna 
Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779 app. at 1852 (2006) 
(illustrating a distinctive taxonomy of both congressional and executive removal powers).  
 24. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of 
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 597 (1984) (“The text and structure 
of the Constitution impose few limits on Congress’s ability to structure administrative 
government.”).  
 25. Arguing against nontextual arguments only, John Manning has recently proposed 
that “the Constitution adopts no freestanding principle of separation of powers” such that 
there is “no one baseline for inferring what a reasonable constitutionmaker would have 
understood ‘the separation of powers’ to mean in the abstract” and in the absence of a textual 
anchor. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939, 1944 (2011). The argument turns on the rejection of Charles Black’s interpretive 
method of drawing inferences from structure and relationships based on a commitment to 
principles of textualist interpretation. Id. at 1946-49; see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., 
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23-26 (1969) (introducing method 
of inference from constitutional structure). Given the persistence of Black’s methodology, 
Manning’s cogent claims are unlikely to find broad acceptance soon.  
Almost three decades earlier, Jesse Choper argued that “[t]he federal judiciary should 
not decide constitutional questions concerning the respective powers of Congress and the 
President vis-à-vis one another” and instead such issues should be “remitted to the interplay 
of the national political process.” JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL 
POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
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contestable normative premises. However perceptive, scholars have had limited 
impact. Certainly, their views found no purchase with the Free Enterprise Fund 
Court. The one lonely precursor to my more tailored justiciability inquiry is a 
stray, conclusory comment by the great constitutional scholar Edward Corwin. 
In a 1927 essay, Corwin passingly said that allocations of the removal power 
should be treated as “a purely political question.”26 That unvarnished, unelabo-
rated, and penetrating insight has, until now, lain idle, unnoticed, and un-
parsed.27  
My inquiry in this Article diverges from past scholarship in a second way: 
It largely accepts the democratic accountability goal of the Free Enterprise 
Fund Court, whereas other scholars expend considerable energy developing 
their own first principles of agency design. They thus invoke goals such as the 
promotion of neutral expertise, the stabilization of market expectations, and the 
need for unbiased agency adjudications to vindicate agency insulation.28 All 
such ends may well be laudable. But it is not clear that they respond to Free 
Enterprise Fund’s logic. In other words, if the Court views democratic ac-
countability as a singularly important constitutional ideal, it is not at all clear 
why alternative normative theories should matter.  
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I addresses doctrinal preliminaries: 
the history and jurisprudence of the removal power and the basic terms of the 
political question doctrine. Its aim is not to be comprehensive on either score 
but to supply sufficient salient details to render lucid ensuing arguments. Of 
 
263 (1980). My analysis differs from Choper’s insofar as it is retail, and not wholesale, in its 
call for nonjusticiability. Moreover, whereas Choper relies on doctrinal and historical 
arguments, I rely on a different political-science-informed toolkit. See also Aziz Z. Huq, 
Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887, 904-44 (2012) 
(using a similar toolkit to cast doubt on judicial presumptions founded on the separation of 
powers). 
 26. Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the 
Constitution, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 398 (1927). 
 27. Indeed, in his subsequent study of the presidency, Corwin took a different view on 
the merits of the removal power question, and suggests that courts, “if Congress wishes,” 
should be able to employ “quo warranto proceedings to test the title to office of successors 
of officers who claim to have been wrongfully removed.” EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE 
PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, at 110 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds, 5th rev. ed. 
1984). 
 28. For an excellent survey of these arguments as applied to financial regulatory 
instruments, see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency 
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 611-23 (2010). There are many articles that take issue 
with the Court’s fixation on, and conception of, democratic accountability. See, e.g., Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 480 (2003) (arguing for a focus on eliminating 
arbitrariness in agency actions); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the 
Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 565 (1998) (“Accountability is the means by which 
the entire people stands apart from the government, in all its segments, and enforces the 
people’s compact with its government. . . . It is a means to enforce the trust placed in the 
representatives.”). 
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central importance, I distinguish the limited holding of Free Enterprise Fund 
from the larger principle that animates it. My focus in this Article, to be clear, 
is on the latter, not the former. I take this approach because it is the latter prin-
ciple, and not the former application, that has the greatest potential, as Judge 
Kavanaugh has presciently noted, to destabilize the regulatory state. Parts II 
and III, the Article’s core, critically examine respectively the two links of the 
Free Enterprise Fund syllogism with the aim of testing the correlation between 
judicial promotion of presidential removal authority and democratic accounta-
bility. Part II considers the equation of removal authority with bureaucratic 
control and finds it wanting. Part III then challenges the linkage of presidential 
control with democratic accountability. Part IV returns to the political question 
doctrine to show how the analyses of Parts II and III undermine the plausibility 
of removal as a judicially manageable standard. It also explores the practical 
consequences of making removal a nonjusticiable political question, and sug-
gests that they are less dramatic than might appear at first blush.  
I. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS 
This Part sets forth doctrinal and historical scaffolding for the arguments 
that follow. It outlines first the development of debates about the removal pow-
er and sketches both the narrow Free Enterprise Fund decision and its more 
ambitious underlying logic. It then maps briefly the political question doctrine.  
A. Removal Before Free Enterprise Fund  
The Constitution’s text does not speak clearly to the structure of federal bu-
reaucracy. It details how federal “officers” are to be appointed,29 but is silent as 
to how almost all such “officers” are to be removed.30 The political branches 
 
 29. The term “officer” has been defined as a person holding a “public station, or 
employment, conferred by the appointment of government.” United States v. Hartwell, 73 
U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867); see also Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991) 
(asking if a post involves “exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United 
States” to determine whether it falls into the class of officers (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam))). The appointment process for officers differs based on 
whether an officer is “inferior” or “principal,” with the latter being necessarily subject to a 
Senate confirmation vote. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. By contrast, Congress can choose to 
vest the appointment of inferior officers “in the President alone, in the courts of Law, or in 
the Heads of Departments.” Id. Inferior officers are ones “whose work is directed and 
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.” Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). 
 30. Removal of officers is only addressed in the Constitution with respect to federal 
judges. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall 
hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”). The Constitution otherwise provides no 
guidance on removal. That is not to say, however, that the Framers of the Constitution were 
silent on this issue. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
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have historically taken the lead in filling that gap.31 Judicial specification of the 
removal power, by contrast, has been historically late and exceptional.32 
The first Congress gave a threshold answer to the removal power question 
when it created departments of war, foreign affairs, and treasury.33 Federal leg-
islators, including former Philadelphia Convention delegates, divided volubly 
on the question whether removal had a constitutional dimension.34 The Senate 
split contentiously down the middle on the appropriate removal rule for the sec-
retaries of war and foreign affairs, leaving Vice President John Adams to cast 
tiebreaking votes.35 Congress settled on textual formulae that omitted specific 
mention of the removal rule for war and foreign affairs department heads.36 By 
contrast, the statute establishing the Treasury specified in detail its functions 
and obligations and, significant here, shielded the office of Comptroller from 
presidential direction.37 However these laws are glossed as evidence of original 
public meaning, they represent an unequivocal and “meaningful instantiation of 
 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The consent of [the Senate] would be necessary to displace as well as 
to appoint [officers].”). 
 31. Some have relied on this lacuna alone to infer broad political discretion as to how 
to organize administrative functions. See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF 
AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997, at 2 (2003) (“By neither describing nor empowering an 
administrative state, the Constitution’s framers granted political actors in legislative and 
executive branches the power to create and design the administrative state based upon their 
own interests.”). 
 32. See CORWIN, supra note 27, at 100 (noting that until 1926, “the Supreme Court . . . 
had contrived to side-step every occasion for a decisive pronouncement regarding the 
removal power, its extent and location”). 
 33. For informative accounts of legislative debates in 1789 that emphasize the 
seriousness of legislative consideration of constitutional issues related to removal power, see 
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 
36-41 (1997); Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 
1021, 1028-29, 1044-67 (2006).  
 34. See CURRIE, supra note 33, at 36-38 (describing arguments both for and against 
inherent presidential removal authority made during the debates); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1256, 1282-89 (2006) (describing the same debates and noting the varied views on 
removal of administrative officers represented in the First Congress).  
 35. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE 
PRESIDENT 53 (Univ. Press of Kan., 4th ed., rev. 1997) (1978); Gerhard Casper, An Essay in 
Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 
237 (1989). 
 36. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 49 (establishing an executive department 
denominated the “Department of War”); Act of July 27, 1789, 1 Stat. 28 (establishing an 
executive department denominated the “Department of Foreign Affairs”). 
 37. See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, §§ 1, 3, 8, 1 Stat. 65, 65-67 (establishing the Treasury 
Department); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 27-28 & n.124 (explaining how the 
statute shielded the Comptroller from presidential control). For useful analyses of the 
treasury legislation, through which Congress retained more control of administration, see 
Casper, supra note 35, at 239-40; Mashaw, supra note 34, at 1284-87. 
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the departmentalist theory” that political branches can resolve constitutional 
questions arising from allocations of removal authority.38  
Nor were these early statutes a last word from the political branches.39 
Roughly a quarter century later, Congress created the Second Bank of the Unit-
ed States with twenty-five directors, only five of whom were removable by the 
President.40 Fifty years thereafter, Congress vested the Senate with a role in all 
removal decisions through the Tenure in Office Act.41 Violation of that statute 
by President Andrew Johnson helped catalyze impeachment proceedings in the 
House.42 Despite Johnson’s acquittal in the Senate, allocations of removal au-
thority remained a matter of controversy. As late as 1916, former President and 
future Chief Justice William Howard Taft could write that “[w]hether the Pres-
ident has the absolute power of removal without the consent of the Senate in 
respect to all offices, the tenure of which is not affected by the Constitution, is 
not definitely settled.”43 
Well into the twentieth century, federal courts remained conspicuous by 
their absence from these removal power debates.44 A smattering of pre-1900 
cases, to be sure, touched on removal, albeit never resolutely so.45 Into the 
 
 38. Prakash, supra note 33, at 1027. 
 39. See FISHER, supra note 35, at 54-55 (describing controversy over Andrew 
Jackson’s removal of the Secretary of the Treasury). 
 40. See Act of Apr. 10, 1816, §§ 1, 8, 3 Stat. 266, 266, 269. 
 41. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 430 (regulating the tenure of certain civil offices) 
(repealed 1887). 
 42. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 
89-180 (1973) (describing events leading up to trial, the articles of impeachment, and the 
trial). 
 43. William Howard Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative and 
the Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 608 (1916). As a Supreme 
Court Justice, Taft would go on to write Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), 
described below in the text accompanying note 47. 
 44. This cannot be explained by positing a more general absence of federal court 
scrutiny of constitutional issues in this period. See Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Self-
Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 579 (2012) (documenting historical patterns in judicial 
willingness to invalidate federal statutes on constitutional grounds); cf. Mark A. Graber, The 
New Fiction: Dred Scott and the Language of Judicial Authority, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 
181 (2007) (counting twenty pre-Civil War cases in which the Supreme Court imposed 
constitutional limits on congressional power). 
 45. See, e.g., Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 327, 343 (1897) (finding that 
Congress conceded to the President the power to remove a District Attorney of the United 
States); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (holding that when Congress, by 
law, vests appointment of inferior officers in heads of departments, it may limit and restrict 
power of removal as it deems best for public interest); Butterworth v. United States ex rel. 
Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 67 (1884) (holding that executive supervision that a head of department 
may exercise over subordinates in administrative and executive matters does not extend to 
matters in which a subordinate is directed by statute to act judicially); Ex parte Hennen, 38 
U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839) (holding that appointment, and removal, of clerks of courts 
properly belongs to courts of law and is not governed by the Constitution). In addition to 
these cases, in 1854, the Court was confronted with a mandamus action filed by a former 
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1860s, Republican legislators “specifically argued that Congress was the ap-
propriate court in which to try [removal] issues” and some “emphatically re-
jected the authority of the judiciary on the issue.”46 So perhaps it is unsurpris-
ing that the Supreme Court has seldom stepped into the fray, even in the 
twentieth century.  
In the 1920s and the 1990s, the Court issued dramatic rulings supporting 
expansive presidential removal authority, and then retreated quickly. In 1926, 
Chief Justice Taft penned the Court’s opinion in Myers v. United States, invali-
dating a statute that forced the President to seek Senate consent before remov-
ing regional postmasters on the ground that “the reasonable construction of the 
Constitution must be that the branches should be kept separate in all cases in 
which they were not expressly blended, and the Constitution should be ex-
pounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires.”47 In the course 
of its extended discussion of history and precedent, Chief Justice Taft’s opinion 
in Myers contained broad pro-presidential language that seemed to sweep away 
much of Congress’s authority to limit presidential removal powers.48 Yet with-
in a decade, the Court in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States upheld for-
cause limits on the President’s authority to remove members of the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) on the ground that the FTC, unlike a postmaster, was 
a “quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial” entity.49 That opaque intervention was 
not welcomed. Humphrey’s Executor, Attorney General Robert Jackson later 
reported, “made Roosevelt madder at the Court than any other decision.”50 In 
 
chief justice of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Minnesota, who had been fired before 
the end of his statutory term, and who claimed the salary owed to him for the part of his 
tenure that he did not serve. United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 
284, 284 (1854). Dodging the question whether the chief’s removal was licit, the Court held 
that it lacked power to issue a writ of mandamus. Id. at 304-05 (identifying “no jurisdiction 
to entertain the application for a writ of mandamus in this instance”). Justice McLean 
dissented, addressed the removal question, and concluded that the magistrate had been 
unlawfully fired. Id. at 310-11 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
 46. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 154 (1999).  
 47. 272 U.S. 52, 116, 176 (1926). The statute provided that the postmaster “shall be 
appointed and may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.” Act of July 12, 1876, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80. 
 48. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 163-64. The Court’s decision leaned heavily on a pro-
presidential reading of the Decision of 1789 and the fact that “no act of Congress, no 
executive act, and no decision of this court” contradicted presidential removal authority. Id. 
at 163. By contrast, the Court downplayed the fact that multiple presidents had signed into 
law legislative limitations on their own removal authority. Id. at 170. In this fashion, the 
Court read available evidence through an aggressively pro-presidential lens.  
 49. 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935); accord Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 
(1958) (finding limits to the President’s power to remove members of the War Claims 
Commission implicit in the preclusion of the President from influencing the Commission’s 
decisions with respect to particular claims). 
 50. JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 
143 (2010). 
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the aftermath of Myers and Humphrey’s Executor, the scope of constitutionally 
compelled presidential removal authority seemed to rest on the character of the 
relevant office, and, in particular, on whether it was properly characterized as 
“executive,” or “quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.”51 The Court, however, 
subsequently showed no appetite for defining Myers’s protection of “execu-
tive” entities in a way that effectively shielded presidential authority. 
The Court embarked on a second, similarly diffident, interventionary bout 
in the 1980s. In Bowsher v. Synar, a divided Court invalidated a provision that 
endowed the Comptroller General with the power to execute deficit-cutting di-
rectives, even though he or she could be removed only through a joint resolu-
tion of Congress and only for certain statutorily defined reasons.52 Under this 
scheme, the President could not initiate removal, although he or she could veto 
a joint resolution and thus protect a Comptroller General at least in the absence 
of veto-proof congressional majorities.53 Notwithstanding contrary dicta in 
Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion,54 respected contemporaneous com-
mentary concluded that “Bowsher should . . . have come out the same way if 
authority to administer the budget law had been given to an officer independent 
of congressional as well as Presidential control.”55 Two years later, the Court 
took a different tack in Morrison v. Olson.56 It sustained the constitutionality of 
an “independent counsel” position insulated from White House control by 
good-cause protection.57 To reconcile the seemingly contradictory rulings in 
Myers and Humphrey’s Executor, Chief Justice Rehnquist disregarded formal-
ist categories of executive and quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions in 
favor of a functional inquiry into whether a constraint on presidential removal 
“unduly trammels on executive authority.”58 By refusing to identify any undue 
trammeling in the independent counsel statute, the Court signaled its tolerance 
for large congressional control of the regulatory state. Only Justice Scalia  
 
 51. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688-90 & n.28 (1988). 
 52. 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (“[W]e conclude that Congress cannot reserve for itself 
the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by 
impeachment.”); id. at 728 (listing the permissible grounds, defined by statute, for the 
Comptroller General’s ouster pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress). The Court’s main 
issue with the authority of the Comptroller General was that Congress is not permitted to 
execute laws, and so cannot constitutionally “grant to an officer under its control what it 
does not possess.” Id. at 726. 
 53. See id. at 728 n.7. 
 54. See id. at 725 n.4 (claiming that the decision does not cast into doubt independent 
agencies). 
 55. David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 
19, 36. 
 56. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 57. Id. at 691.  
 58. Id. at 690-91. 
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dissented, arguing that “the statute vests some purely executive power in a per-
son who is not the President of the United States [and so] is void.”59  
As the twentieth century came to a close, judicial control of the removal 
power’s allocation remained tentative. The Court had invalidated a congres-
sional limitation on presidential removal authority in only one instance, Myers, 
and that case proved to have scant lasting effect on the law. The precedential 
ground for fresh judicial supervision of removal questions seemed, at best, a 
distant prospect. History, though, may prove to be an untrustworthy guide.  
B. Free Enterprise Fund  
In the 2010 case of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, a five-Justice majority of the Court invalidated the “for-
cause” statutory removal protections of the PCAOB on the ground that they vi-
olated the constitutional separation of powers and the Vesting Clause of Article 
II.60 The outcome in Free Enterprise Fund assumed a two-part syllogism: first, 
presidential removal authority creates presidential control of the bureaucracy; 
second, such presidential control is a prerequisite to the democratic accounta-
bility mandated by Article II. The holding of Free Enterprise Fund requires 
that Presidents have only some control and hence some removal power. But the 
case can be read as support for the larger proposition that Article II requires 
relatively unfettered presidential removal power across many federal offices 
and agencies beyond the PCAOB. 
In 2002, Congress created the PCAOB in response to accounting scandals 
at Enron and WorldCom.61 Congress modeled the board on self-regulatory en-
tities long familiar in financial sector regulation.62 But Congress also placed the 
Board under the control of the SEC, which appoints its members,63 approves its 
budget,64 and can generally oversee the performance of, and enforce, the 
 
 59. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 60. 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3154 (2010) (holding that the Act “is contrary to Article II’s 
vesting of the executive power in the President”). 
 61. Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization—PCAOB in the Footsteps 
of Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, and Freytag, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2268 
(2011). 
 62. Richard H. Pildes, Putting Power Back into Separation of Powers Analysis: Why 
the SEC-PCAOB Structure is Constitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 85, 86, 92, 
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/articles/2009/11/Pildes-62-Vand-L-Rev-En-Banc-
85.pdf (2009) (noting that Congress “borrowed” aspects of existing self-regulatory 
organizations such as the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers in creating the PCAOB). 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4) (2011) (vesting SEC with appointment power upon 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors). 
 64. Id. § 7219(b). 
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Board’s duties.65 The PCAOB can compel document production or testimony 
only by securing a subpoena from the SEC.66 Relevant here, a PCAOB member 
could be removed by the SEC alone, and only “in accordance with [statutorily-
defined procedures], for good cause shown before the expiration of the term of 
that member.”67 
The Free Enterprise Fund litigation arose from a pre-enforcement chal-
lenge by a Board-registered accounting firm that had been investigated, but not 
sanctioned, by the PCAOB.68 Litigation proceeded on two noteworthy assump-
tions. First, Chief Justice Roberts explained for the Court that none of the par-
ties had asked the tribunal to “reexamine” precedent such as Humphrey’s  
Executor and Morrison.69 Hence, the case was decided on the assumption that 
those cases remained good law. Second, and more controversially, the Court 
followed the parties’ briefs in assuming that SEC members could be removed 
by the President only for cause.70 But the organic statute of the SEC, enacted in 
the wake of Myers, omitted any removal provision for fear of “jeopardizing the 
whole scheme” if a for-cause provision was included.71 In effect, the Court thus 
“insert[ed] a protection of tenure that the legislature did not enact.”72 This un-
orthodox stipulation of law allowed the Court to frame the question presented 
as focused on the constitutionality of “dual for-cause limitations” on presiden-
tial control.73 The Court could then write Free Enterprise Fund on an exceed-
ingly narrow decisional canvas, ostensibly bracketing for another day questions 
about how its new principle would extend to the larger regulatory state.  
The Court found the PCAOB’s dual for-cause removal protection “incom-
patible with the Constitution’s separation of powers”74 in two steps. First, it 
viewed removal authority as a paradigmatic means to achieve presidential con-
trol of the bureaucracy.75 Second, the Court took presidential control as the 
 
 65. Id. § 7217(a). 
 66. Id. § 7215(b)(2)(D). 
 67. Id. § 7211(e)(6); see also id. § 7217(d)(3) (detailing removal procedures). 
 68. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3149-50 
(2010). 
 69. Id. at 3146-47. 
 70. Id. at 3148-49. 
 71. Strauss, supra note 61, at 2276. 
 72. See id. For divergent views on the propriety of relying on stipulations of law based 
on party agreement, compare Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda 
Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 702-03 (2012) (criticizing the Free 
Enterprise Fund Court’s reliance on the for-cause removal stipulation and arguing that Chief 
Justice Roberts, author of the majority opinion, “seems to have some explaining to do”), 
with Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1218-34 (2011) (defending 
judicial use of legal stipulations). 
 73. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151. 
 74. Id. at 3155. 
 75. See id. at 3143-44, 3151-53. 
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unique vector for the democratic accountability that Article II commanded.76 
As a result of these two causal inferences, it invalidated the statutory provision 
limiting SEC removal authority over the Board but otherwise left the PCAOB’s 
structure and functions intact.77 Both steps merit further explanation. 
In the syllogism’s first step, the Court identified removal as a key mecha-
nism for controlling the administrative state.78 The “only issue in th[e] case,” 
Chief Justice Roberts stated, “is whether Congress may deprive the President of 
adequate control over the Board.”79 The only mechanism of “control” the Court 
considered was removal authority. It described the Board as “substantially  
insulated from the Commission’s control” solely on the basis of dual for-cause 
protection.80 It also ranked the SEC as beyond the President’s “direct control” 
based on the putatively limited White House removal authority.81 Responding 
to Justice Breyer’s suggestion that the President could use levers other than  
removal to secure control, the Court evinced scorn. “The Framers,” explained 
Chief Justice Roberts, “did not rest our liberties on such bureaucratic minuti-
ae.”82 Control, in the Court’s analysis, turned exclusively on the allocation of 
removal power. 
At the second step, the Court identified democratic accountability as a con-
stitutionally compelled value and explained that presidential control was a ve-
hicle to attain that value.83 Indeed, it is worth emphasizing that the Free  
Enterprise Fund majority opinion is drafted as if the only constitutional good to 
be pursued in administrative agency design is democratic accountability. The 
Court, that is, ignored the pleadings of scholars who had pointed to the plurality 
of goods a reasonable designer could seek to vindicate in drawing up an admin-
istrative agency.84 The Court rooted this laser-like focus in the assumptions of 
the Framers. Drawing on James Madison’s arguments in The Federalist No. 51, 
the Court made a point of identifying “dependence on the people” as the  
 
 76. See id. at 3155. 
 77. Id. at 3161-62 (declining to invalidate the statute in its entirety, instead severing 
the unconstitutional dual for-cause removal provisions from the remainder of the statute). 
The Court also rejected three other constitutional challenges to the PCAOB. See id. at 3162-
63 (addressing petitioner’s arguments that PCAOB members were principal officers whose 
appointment required Senate advice and consent, that the SEC was not a “Departmen[t]” that 
can appoint inferior officers, and that appointment by the entire Commission rather than the 
SEC Chairman acting alone violated the Appointments Clause). 
 78. For passages of the opinion emphasizing the equation of removal and control, see 
id. at 3148, 3153, 3158, 3160. 
 79. Id. at 3161. 
 80. See id. at 3148. 
 81. See id. at 3153. 
 82. Id. at 3156; accord id. at 3157 (“Congress cannot reduce the Chief Magistrate to a 
cajoler-in-chief.”); id. at 3158-59 (rejecting budgetary authority as a tool of general control).  
 83. See id. at 3156 (“Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern 
themselves, through their elected leaders.”); id. at 3164 (stating that the Court’s remedy left 
the PCAOB “a constitutional agency accountable to the Executive”). 
 84. See generally sources cited supra note 28. 
HUQ 65 STAN. L. REV. 1.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2012 10:17 AM 
January 2013] REMOVAL AS A POLITICAL QUESTION 17 
“primary control on the government,”85 and explained why such dependence 
was uniquely enabled by presidential control of the bureaucracy: 
 The diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability. The 
people do not vote for the Officers of the United States. They instead look to 
the President to guide the assistants or deputies . . . subject to his superintend-
ence. Without a clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot de-
termine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or se-
ries of pernicious measures ought really to fall. That is why the Framers 
sought to ensure that those who are employed in the execution of the law will 
be in their proper situation, and the chain of dependence be preserved; the 
lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend, as they ought, 
on the President, and the President on the community.86 
The balance of the Court’s opinion repeatedly underscored the Constitu-
tion’s perceived command that the President “hold . . . to account” agency 
decisionmakers so as to achieve Article II’s ultimate object of enabling demo-
cratic control through retrospective voting—that is, the exercise of the fran-
chise based on an aggregative assessment of an incumbent presidential candi-
date’s achievements while in office, including the actions of agencies such as 
the PCAOB.87 Building on this architectural principle and, not incidentally, 
quoting Myers, Chief Justice Roberts explained that because “Article II confers 
on the President ‘the general administrative control of those executing the 
laws,’” it follows that the White House “must have some ‘power of removing 
those for whom he can not continue to be responsible.’”88 Without such power, 
the Court implied, the public would lose its influence on federal policy.89 Turn-
ing to the specific matter at hand, the Court invalidated the limitation on the 
SEC’s power to remove PCAOB members, but treated the relevant removal 
provisions as severable and therefore upheld the balance of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
framework.90 The Board accordingly survived unscathed except for a marginal 
increase in its exposure to now-unfettered SEC removal authority. It continues 
to operate much as it always did.  
Chief Justice Roberts’s ruling is amenable to both narrow and broad read-
ings. The narrow reading of Free Enterprise Fund is that dual for-cause remov-
al arrangements are unconstitutional. The Court did not overrule Morrison v. 
 
 85. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3157 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). In another passage linking presidential control 
to democratic accountability, the Court criticized the insulated agencies as being “immune 
from Presidential oversight, even as they exercised power in the people’s name.” Id. at 3154. 
 86. Id. at 3155 (omission in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87. Id. at 3154 (“The President . . . cannot hold the Commission fully accountable for 
the Board’s conduct, to the same extent that he may hold the Commission accountable for 
everything else that it does.”). The classic exposition of retrospective voting is MORRIS P. 
FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981). 
 88. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3152 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 
117, 164 (1926)).  
 89. See id. at 3155. 
 90. Id. at 3161-62. 
HUQ 65 STAN. L. REV. 1.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2012 10:17 AM 
18 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
Olson91 or Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,92 cases involving single-
level removal schemas. Even so limited, one commentator has argued that Free 
Enterprise Fund’s “implications” may well be “enormous.”93 Nevertheless, my 
aim in this Article is not to focus on that particular, narrow holding. Rather, the 
balance of this Article bores down to focus on the broader and more ambitious 
gloss on Free Enterprise Fund’s fundamental logic: that there is a tight nexus 
between constitutionally mandated democratic accountability and presidential 
removal authority. This logic seemingly applies to most officials who are insu-
lated in some fashion from presidential control. The majority opinion in Free 
Enterprise Fund supplies no reason to limit that syllogism to dual for-cause 
removal arrangements. To the contrary, “Free Enterprise Fund reflects a robust 
principle of presidential entitlement to control administrative government”94 
that is violated as much by a single good-cause restriction with bite as by a dual 
for-cause restriction. Whatever “good lawyerly grounds” may exist for limiting 
it, the principle of presidential control cannot be “inherently confined to se-
cond-layer removal provisions.”95 Instead, Free Enterprise Fund’s “reasoning 
sets the foundation for challenging the constitutionality of agency independ-
ence”96 and hence undermining the structural foundations for much of the cur-
rent regulatory state. 
 
 91. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 92. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 93. Strauss, supra note 61, at 2281. 
 94. Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the 
Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Accountability, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (2010); accord Goldstein & Howe, supra note 13, at 969. 
 95. Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 
2417 (2011). Stack develops a distinct account of the decision, focusing on the fact that it 
treats agencies with both adjudicative and nonadjudicative functions as necessarily within 
the ambit of presidential control, whereas previous decisions had treated the presence of any 
adjudicative function as sufficient to negate the need for presidential control. Id. at 2414-15 
(describing the “different baseline” after Free Enterprise Fund). Another limiting principle 
is offered by Kent Barnett, who argues that for-cause tenure protections can be sorted into 
strong, weak, and intermediate categories as a way of cabining the reach of Free Enterprise 
Fund. Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1349, 1352 (2012). As Barnett candidly recognizes, Chief Justice Robert’s “paean to the 
unitary executive” provides little purchase for a more nuanced analysis. Id. at 1365. 
Although Barnett’s limiting principle is carefully delineated and inventive, its strongest 
justification is that it closely hews to conventional expectations of what the Court’s limited 
political capital would allow. This seems a somewhat unsatisfying ultimate justification for a 
rule of constitutional law.  
 96. Rao, supra note 13, at 2550; see also Victoria F. Nourse & John P. Figura, Toward 
a Representational Theory of the Executive, 91 B.U. L. REV. 273, 294 (2011) (reviewing 
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008)) (“In plain English, the ‘removal power’ position 
comes down to the claim that independent agencies are unconstitutional.”). 
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The opinion contains subtle harbingers of such ambition. Chief Justice 
Roberts conspicuously celebrated Myers as a “landmark” case.97 In this and 
other ways, his opinion plausibly can be read as “self-consciously plant[ing] the 
seeds for further extensions” of the unitary executive view that the President 
should fully control the entire executive branch.98 Such an interpretation finds 
support in the Roberts Court’s habit of approaching disfavored precedents 
obliquely, gradually undermining them by “stealth overruling”99 before an 
overt rejection of stare decisis. There is no reason to expect that the bread-
crumbs conspicuously dropped in Free Enterprise Fund presage a different 
course.  
The opinion has not escaped either lower courts’ or litigants’ attention. A 
July 2011 concurrence from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals signals Free  
Enterprise Fund’s potential for expansive interpretation. Judge Brett 
Kavanaugh explained that “[the Free Enterprise Fund] Court’s rhetoric and 
reasoning are notably in tension with Humphrey’s Executor.”100 Judge 
Kavanaugh identified and quoted at length ten passages of Free Enterprise 
Fund hinting at such wider repercussions.101 To be sure, the D.C. Circuit  
cannot itself overrule Supreme Court precedent such as Humphrey’s Executor. 
But Judge Kavanaugh’s views are worth attending to in this context. It was,  
after all, his dissent that the Free Enterprise Fund Court cited and substantially 
tracked in 2010.102  
Nor have interest groups capable of developing federal court litigation been 
resting on their laurels. In June 2012, a Texas bank, a retiree association, and an 
advocacy organization filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia asserting that the newly minted Consumer Financial  
 
 97. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152 
(2010).  
 98. Pildes, supra note 94, at 8. 
 99. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to 
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 3-4 & nn.2-3 (2011) (collecting sources supporting the 
argument that the Roberts Court majority often “act[s] disingenuously, . . . overruling sub 
silentio what [it] would not overturn explicitly”). 
100. In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 444 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring); accord id. at 446 (“[T]here can be little doubt that the Free Enterprise Court’s 
wording and reasoning are in tension with Humphrey’s Executor and are more in line with 
Chief Justice Taft’s majority opinion in Myers.”). 
101. See id. at 444-45. 
102. Compare Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3156-59 (citing Judge Kavanaugh’s 
dissent in the lower court and discussing the legality of the PCAOB dual for-cause removal 
regime), with Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 669, 
709-12 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (discussing many of the same issues 
addressed in Chief Justice Roberts’s Supreme Court opinion). Chief Justice Roberts 
repeatedly cited and quoted Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 
3156, 3159, 3160 n.10. Such extensive and overt quotation evinces the Court’s high regard 
of Judge Kavanaugh’s analysis. 
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Protection Bureau (CFPB) violated the separation of powers.103 Citing Free 
Enterprise Fund, the complaint asserted that Congress had “eliminat[ed] . . . the 
necessary checks and balances upon the CFPB’s exercise of . . . power” and 
thus had crossed a constitutional red line.104 And there is no reason to believe 
this suit will be the last effort to expand the reach of Free Enterprise Fund. To 
the contrary, so long as litigants reckon that they can count five favorable 
votes, such litigation should be expected to persist.  
In harmony with Judge Kavanaugh’s analysis, the balance of this Article 
therefore focuses on the two more general claims that underlie Free Enterprise 
Fund: (1) that removal authority is a constitutionally privileged vector of bu-
reaucratic control, and (2) that presidential control of the bureaucracy is neces-
sary to achieve democratic accountability (or at least the level of democratic 
accountability that in the Court’s view is constitutionally guaranteed). These 
propositions do not imply that the power to remove ensures plenary control. 
Nor do they provide a method of ascertaining how much removal authority is 
necessary in any given case. But they do imply that removal authority is suffi-
ciently important for maintaining Article II values that it is an appropriate basis 
for close judicial review.  
C. The Political Question Doctrine  
 Even if presidential removal authority falls within an Article II penumbra, 
does that mean federal courts should resolve challenges to statutory removal 
rules? Not necessarily. Federal courts long ago developed a “political question” 
doctrine to quarantine a domain of constitutional norms not enforced by federal 
courts. Intimated first by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v.  
Madison,105 the political question doctrine has evolved into a rather complex 
framework for sorting constitutional questions between judicial and political 
branch resolution.106 It secured canonical formulation in the Baker v. Carr 
Court’s enumeration of several factors that may independently trigger 
nonjusticiability.107 While the resulting doctrine is not subject to easy sum-
mary, the Court’s analysis underscored that the political question doctrine is 
“primarily a function of the separation of powers.”108  
 
103. Complaint at 3, 25-27, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 01-032 
(D.D.C. June 21, 2012), available at http://cei.org/sites/default/files/ 
SNB%20v%20Geithner%20-%20Complaint.PDF.  
104. Id. at 27.  
105. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“Questions, in their nature political, or which 
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this 
court.”). 
106. For a detailed account of the doctrine’s evolution, see Rachel E. Barkow, More 
Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial 
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 248-73 (2002).  
107. See 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
108. Id. at 210. 
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Consistent with this view, the political question doctrine has been invoked 
frequently in cases touching on the design of political institutions. For instance, 
it has been employed to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over challenges to 
impeachment proceedings,109 the seating of delegates at national political con-
ventions,110 and regulation of the conduct of the National Guard.111 And this is 
only a partial list.112 As Chief Justice Marshall explained, such disputes tend to 
“respect the nation, not individual rights.”113 They also fit poorly into the fed-
eral courts’ common law model of bilateral dispute resolution.114 Judicial reso-
lution of structural controversies may be especially undesirable given courts’ 
inability to gather and aggregate the views of diverse actors potentially affected 
by a design decision. Such disputes are thought better resolved by the political 
branches, “each of which has resources available to protect and assert its  
interests.”115  
 
109. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-35 (1993) (holding that the judiciary 
may not review the procedures used by Congress to impeach judges). 
110. O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1972) (granting a stay of a circuit court order 
that held a dispute over the seating of delegates at a national political convention to be 
justiciable).  
111. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6, 11-12 (1973). 
112. For further questions of political structure that have been ranked as political 
questions by the Supreme Court, see, for example, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 452-56 
(1939) (holding that the procedures for ratification of constitutional amendments are entirely 
within the discretion of Congress and therefore nonjusticiable); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149-51 (1912) (dismissing as a political question the issue whether a 
direct popular referendum violated the constitutional guarantee of republican government). 
Recent challenges to President Barack Obama’s qualifications have generally been rejected 
as nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Barnett v. Obama, No. SACV 09-0082, 2009 WL 3861788, at 
*14-15 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) (rejecting as a political question a challenge to President 
Obama’s election on the ground that he was not a natural-born citizen), aff’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Drake v. Obama, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011) (focusing in large part on 
the plaintiff’s lack of standing to bring suit rather than the political nature of the issue), cert. 
denied sub nom. Keyes v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 2748 (2012). And commentators have 
suggested that the legal disputes over the line of presidential succession equally fall outside 
Article III competence. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential 
Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 156-57 (1995) (“Congress’s power to specify what 
‘Officer’ shall succeed to the presidency in the event of double death, incapacity, 
resignation, or removal is not subject to judicial review because of the political question 
doctrine.”). 
113. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). The implication of this 
statement is that the courts are adept at addressing individual rather than national or public 
rights. Whether the judiciary is effective in protecting constitutionally guaranteed, judicially 
protected individual rights, however, is a matter of controversy. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, What 
Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 401-03 (2010) (casting doubt on the utility of 
habeas corpus hearings in the recent and politically contentious Guantánamo military 
detention context). 
114. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) 
(arguing that the Article III “judicial Power” solely comprises “the power to act in the 
manner traditional for English and American courts”).  
115. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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The relevant trigger here for nonjusticiability under political question rules 
is the potential “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards.”116 
The Court has “never attempted to define” what it means by a judicially man-
ageable standard.117 It has suggested that a judicially manageable rule must be 
“principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions,” in contrast to a 
legislated rule, which “can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc.”118 According 
to a plurality of the Court, a rule of decision fails this test when it relies exces-
sively on jurists’ subjective judgments,119 or when it fails to generate predicta-
ble guidance.120 By contrast, the mere fact that the policy-related effects of a 
rule of decision are clouded with uncertainty ex ante is insufficient to warrant a 
finding of nonjusticiability.121 A leading scholarly account, offered by Richard 
 
116. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The other possible triggers include a 
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” to another branch, “the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” 
an implicit expression through judicial resolution of a “lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches,” “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made,” and potential embarrassment from “multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.” Id. Another potential trigger for the political question doctrine 
not explicitly recognized in Baker but relevant to the removal question is the very absence of 
a textual assignment of removal authority. In Goldwater v. Carter, Justice Rehnquist 
suggested that the Constitution’s silence as to how the United States could withdraw from 
treaties (by presidential action alone, or with the necessary involvement of the Senate), was a 
political question in part because the text was “silent as to [the Senate’s] participation in the 
abrogation of a treaty.” 444 U.S. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist’s 
position implies that removal questions should not be settled by a federal court given the 
absence of textual specification.  
117. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional 
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1281 (2006); accord id. at 1278 (“In [deciding what is a 
judicially manageable standard], the Court, willy-nilly, conducts a startlingly open-ended 
inquiry in which, among other things, it weighs the costs and benefits of adjudicating 
pursuant to particular proposed standards.”). 
118. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
119. Cf. id. at 288 (stating that a judicial test for partisan gerrymandering was 
unmanageable when it required a court to determine first which party was in the majority in 
the state under circumstances in which both parties win some statewide offices). 
120. See id. at 291 (rejecting a rule based on “[f]airness” because it is not sufficiently 
“solid and . . . demonstrably met” to “enable the state legislatures to discern the limits of 
their districting discretion” and fails to “meaningfully constrain the discretion of the 
courts”). 
121. An example of the Court’s unwillingness to treat a controversy as nonjusticiable 
merely because of the complexity and magnitude of the policy consequences arose in the 
October Term 2011. In Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Court considered a case 
justiciable despite the complex and uncertain impact that a judicial intervention might have 
on foreign policy and international relations. See 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1426, 1428, 1430 (2012) 
(holding the issue justiciable despite the lower courts’ concerns that judicial intervention 
would require courts to weigh in on the political status of Jerusalem, a contentious foreign 
policy issue); id. at 1439-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the claim should be 
considered nonjusticiable in light of the complex foreign policy issues involved and the 
likelihood that judicial intervention would result in “uncertain” political reactions in the 
Middle East). Consistent with Zivotofsky, this Article does not argue that merely because the 
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Fallon, has glossed the idea of a judicially manageable standard by observing 
that a rule may be underinclusive or overinclusive, but it cannot “diverge too 
far from the meaning of the constitutional guarantee that it implements.”122 
Courts must be able to “generate predictable and consistent results,” taking 
judges’ epistemic constraints into account.123  
Rather than essaying a comprehensive account of what a judicially man-
ageable standard, I focus here on the minimal condition that a rule must be 
“principled” and “rational,” and not generate “inconsistent, illogical, [or] ad 
hoc” results.124 That condition does not require a perfect fit between a judicial-
ly crafted rule of decision and the underlying constitutional principle that justi-
fies the rule. Manageable rules will often be somewhat over- or underinclusive 
in relation to those values.125 Yet there must be some fit between a rule and the 
desired results. It cannot be, that is, that judges can select a rule of decision to 
enforce a given constitutional value when there is either no reliable causal link 
between the rule and the value, or where the link is so weak as to render that 
rule an “ad hoc” and unprincipled device for enforcing the value. To permit 
judges to select such rules would endow them with precisely the kind of unfet-
tered discretion that the Court has condemned.126 In short, I will assume that 
where a rule of decision produces results that are systematically uncorrelated 
with its underlying constitutional justifications, there is an absence of judicially 
manageable standards. 
 
underlying constitutional question of how removal power was allocated presents great 
complexity, it should be ranked as nonjusticiable. Unlike Vieth, however, Zivotofsky did not 
examine a specific rule of decision to ascertain its justiciability. Indeed, earlier precedent 
suggests that an inquiry into the meaning of a specific constitutional text can yield the 
conclusion that the latter supplies no judicially manageable standard. See, e.g., Nixon v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (finding that the word “try” in the Impeachment 
Trial Clause “lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of 
review of the Senate’s actions”).  
122. Fallon, supra note 117, at 1282-84. 
123. Id. at 1289-92 (italics and capitalization omitted). 
124. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
125. In using the word “rule” in this context, I do not mean to exclude what in the 
context of another debate are distinguished as “standards.” Both rules and standards can be 
judicially manageable or unfit for deployment in federal court depending on the 
circumstances.  
126. Others have pointed to the scope of judicial discretion as a touchstone for the 
analysis of judicially manageable standards. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. 
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1786 (2012) 
(arguing that the nondelegation rule has been treated as a nonjusticiable rule because “[t]he 
danger is too grave that if courts attempted to police the boundaries of permissible 
delegation, they would approve of delegations that seemed to them necessary in light of 
policy realities, and disapprove of those that did not”). If courts could pick rules of decision 
with only weak connections to underlying constitutional justifications, their ability to pick 
and choose between potential rules would yield the same kind of impermissibly freewheeling 
judicial maneuvering. 
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The balance of the Article argues that Free Enterprise Fund’s doctrinal 
rule, which focuses on presidential removal authority as a mechanism for pro-
moting democratic accountability, does not provide a judicially manageable 
standard. To be clear, making good on that claim means meeting no small bur-
den of persuasion. I must show that there is no stable or reliable correlation be-
tween the promotion of presidential removal authority and democratic account-
ability. It is not sufficient to this end to point to mere slippage or a looseness of 
causal fit. This alone would not demonstrate that the rule of decision had 
strayed “too far.”127 Rather, I must demonstrate that there are systematic rea-
sons for believing that the correlation between constitutional values and deci-
sional rules is so fragile that it is implausible to hold up that rule as a stable and 
constant means of promoting the value. 
The argument proceeds in two stages, which correspond to the following 
two Parts. First, in Part II, I show that the removal power is only weakly, if at 
all, correlated with presidential control, and that the chief executive will often 
reasonably prefer to use other technologies of control because the collateral 
costs of removal render it ineffectual. Therefore, removal authority is not the 
signal touchstone of presidential control that the Free Enterprise Fund Court 
assumes. Indeed, it will often be irrelevant to such control. Part III then shows 
that there is no consistent correlation between presidential control and demo-
cratic accountability. Perhaps counterintuitively, increasing presidential control 
has no reliable effect on democratic accountability. This is a result of interac-
tion effects and strategic responses to judicial interventions. Put together, these 
two points sever the purported linkage between allocations of removal authority 
and democratic accountability. As Part IV develops at length, this means that 
the Court cannot use removal as a reliable proxy for democratic accountability, 
because the former has only an “inconsistent” and “ad hoc” effect on the latter. 
Stated in doctrinal terms, this means that the core syllogism of Free Enterprise 
Fund cannot yield a judicially manageable standard. 
II. REMOVAL AUTHORITY AS A MEANS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL  
This Part takes up the first part of Free Enterprise Fund’s syllogism: the 
claim that the removal power is an important, even essential, tool in establish-
ing control of an agency. By subjecting this causal assertion to careful scrutiny, 
I aim to take a first step toward showing that the Court’s rule of decision is un-
correlated to the ultimate constitutional good of democratic accountability. To 
ascertain whether removal authority is indeed central to the problem of bureau-
cratic control, I begin by situating removal within the larger context of mecha-
nisms available to the White House to influence administrative outcomes. 
Merely the existence of multiple mechanisms for presidential control of the  
 
127. Fallon, supra note 117, at 1282-84 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 291 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)). 
HUQ 65 STAN. L. REV. 1.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2012 10:17 AM 
January 2013] REMOVAL AS A POLITICAL QUESTION 25 
bureaucracy provides a threshold reason for questioning the existence of any 
necessary nexus between removal and control. Moreover, attention to the inter-
actions between these alternative mechanisms of presidential control suggests 
that the marginal effect of a judicial intervention invalidating a for-cause provi-
sion will vary from case to case. Further, my analysis suggests that replenished 
presidential removal power can interact with other design features to produce 
unintended and undesirable effects. All of this suggests that Presidents will not 
prioritize removal as a tool for reining in agencies. 
Having compared removal with substitute technologies of control, I con-
sider whether removal is indeed as powerful a tool as the Free Enterprise Fund 
syllogism suggests. I argue that it is not. An analysis that focuses on infor-
mation asymmetries and transaction costs shows that the presidential power to 
remove will not necessarily cash out as control of an administrative agency. In-
deed, removal can have positively undesirable collateral effects. In drawing 
Part II to a close, I marshal empirical evidence to show that this is more than a 
theoretical possibility. Both historical evidence from the United States and 
comparative evidence from the United Kingdom, where prime ministers have 
plenary removal authority, suggest that the possession of removal authority 
yields no guarantee of bureaucratic control. In short, it is wrong to assume that 
the removal power will always be an important or even effectual tool of agency 
control.  
A. The Plural Technologies of Bureaucratic Control  
To understand the relationship of removal power to the control of bureau-
crats’ policy decisions, it is helpful to start from the simple proposition that 
there is what economists term an agency relationship between the agency and 
its superiors. Implicit in the analysis offered by the Free Enterprise Fund Court 
is the model of an elected official, who is the principal, trying to ensure that the 
bureaucrat, who is the agent, complies with the former’s wishes.128 If the 
agent’s acts diverge from the principal’s preferences, a problem arises that is 
commonly called agency slack.129 Hence, a way to frame the removal-control 
question here is whether the power of removal is so central to the mitigation of 
agency slack that it warrants a constitutional gloss. In pursuing this analysis, it 
is worth stressing at the outset that at issue is the President’s possession of such 
power, not necessarily the frequent use of a removal power. Actual exercise of 
removal power may be unnecessary to abate substantial agency slack. A  
 
128. Cf. ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 134 (1967) (characterizing 
bureaucracies in principal-agent terms). 
129. For general discussion of the problems that arise in agency relations in the 
democratic context, see Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203, 207, 209-10 (2005) (identifying numerous kinds of agency slack 
present under democratic governance); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 
28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 756-57 (1984) (developing a similar analysis). 
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credible threat of removal induces a stable equilibrium in which agency slack 
takes a de minimis value. In the few instances an agent strays, removal power is 
flexed pour encourager les autres. Hence, the absence of observed removals is 
no reason to think that removal does not matter to the balance of power internal 
to government. 
Viewing the link between removal and control in agency terms highlights a 
peculiar lacuna in the Court’s analysis. Agency relationships are common cur-
rency in contract and corporate law. But in these private law contexts, it is rare-
ly the case that agency slack is minimized solely by power to extinguish an 
agent’s authority. Rather, agency costs in private contracting are mitigated by a 
range of strategies that include selection filters, monitoring, incentives, and in-
surance.130 These tools operate both ex ante and ex post. In many private law 
contexts, the cost of monitoring agents outpaces the cost of selecting “good” 
agents initially. Wise principals hence can either invest in ex ante selection or 
in ex post monitoring and discipline.131 In some cases, the former will domi-
nate the latter. (Consider in this regard the academic practice of lateral hiring 
with tenure.) This is often true in employment situations where it can be too 
costly to monitor closely agents’ efforts, but where job markets generate pow-
erful signals to separate potential employees into good and bad types.132 By 
contrast, Free Enterprise Fund focused narrowly on one control mechanism. It 
styled removal as the sine qua non of political control.133 All else was relegated 
to the sidelines as irrelevant “bureaucratic minutiae.”134  
A threshold question, therefore, is whether the problem of agency slack 
must be analyzed differently in the private and public contexts because of the 
range of available control mechanisms in private law that have no analog in the 
public context.135 This in turn invites an inquiry into alternative mechanisms 
that Presidents may have at their disposal to regulate agency action.136 It takes 
 
130. See generally Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and 
Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55, 55-57 (1979) (exploring agency models).  
131. TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOOD 
GOVERNMENT 99 (2006) (identifying monitoring and selection as the principal difficulties in 
political agency problems). Legal scholars also assume that “[t]he key to independence is 
security of tenure.” BERNARD SCHWARZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.10 (3d ed. 1991); accord 
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 96, at 7; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 23, at 596-97; 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 51-52. 
132. On this class of sorting problems, see Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 
Q.J. ECON. 355, 361-68 (1973). 
133. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3153 
(2010). 
134. Id. at 3156. 
135. Cf. JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: 
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 11 (1997) (“Production in public 
bureaucracies nearly always differs from production in private firms . . . .”).  
136. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 30 (2010) (emphasizing “the need to look beyond 
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only brief inquiry to suggest that the array of devices for presidential control of 
the bureaucracy is vast137:  
 Presidential appointment power: Article II of the Constitution vests the 
President with indefeasible control over the selection of “principal of-
ficers” subject to possible rejection by the Senate.138 “The power to ap-
point key personnel is one of the President’s most important instruments 
for asserting his will over the executive branch.”139 Presidents greatly 
influence the pool of senior federal appointees.140 President Reagan, for 
example, used appointments in a “systematic” way to “promot[e] politi-
cal responsiveness.”141 To be sure, the power to appoint is no panacea. 
Appointees can “drift” from presidential preferences,142 although there 
is some question about the magnitude of this phenomenon.143 And in-
dependent agencies structured as multimember boards with staggered 
appointment schedules can make presidential control more costly.144 
 
removal if the goal is to create the strongest barrier possible against capture,” but making 
points that apply more broadly).  
137. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 96, at 7 (noting that removal is but “one among 
many factors that affect presidential control over executive branch officials”). In what 
follows, I focus on mechanisms available to White House actors, and not on mechanisms 
available to Congress, except where a legislative technology of control is fungible between 
the branches. Of course, many congressional tools to control the bureaucracy are not 
fungible. See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or 
Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. 
POL. ECON. 765, 769-70 (1983) (noting how Congress can exert influence over agencies by 
favoring top performers, holding oversight hearings, and wisely using the existence of 
confirmation hearings to influence nominations). 
138. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132-37 (1976) (per 
curiam) (describing effect of Appointments Clause and holding that Congress cannot appoint 
officers).  
139. M. Elizabeth Magill, The First Word, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 27, 38 (2007). 
140. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 110-11 
(2011) (providing a brief typology of selection mechanisms). 
141. Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 235, 235 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985). 
142. Magill, supra note 139, at 37.  
143. For empirical and theoretical grounds for skepticism about the prospect of agency 
drift from the preferences of elected superiors, see Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, 
Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2143-
45 (2004); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative 
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 119-23 (2000). Ideological shift in the views of Supreme Court 
Justices is said to be “pervasive,” see Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme 
Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1486 (2007), 
but that drift arises only in the space of what are several presidential terms, see id. at 1504-
14.  
144. Some agencies also have bipartisanship requirements in addition to multimember, 
staggered boards, see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (2011) (providing that no more than three 
of the six appointed members of the Federal Election Commission can be affiliated with the 
same political party), a structure that further increases the costs associated with establishing 
presidential control over agency leadership. 
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But this friction should not be overstated. Empirical studies suggest that 
it takes the White House on average only nine to ten months to obtain a 
party majority on such boards.145 Presidents also exercise significant 
agenda control via their power to appoint the chairs of multimember 
commissions.146 The FCC chair, for example, “serves at the President’s 
pleasure, controls the agenda [and] bring[s] to a vote only those items 
for which he or she has support.”147  
 Budgeting control: The modern White House has distinct budgetary and 
regulatory control tools. Until 1921, Congress exercised substantial con-
trol over the bureaucracy by dint of its budgeting primacy.148 Through 
legislation in 1921, as amended in 1939, Presidents gained substantial 
power to propose, supervise, and control the budget of even independ-
ent agencies.149 Recently, however, Congress has exempted some (but 
 
145. Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization 
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 469 (2008); id. at 470 (reporting 
that it took on average twenty-six months for Presidents to secure an absolute majority of 
their own appointees). A President’s ability to make recess appointments to fill vacancies, 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3, likely contributes to the ease with which Presidents can 
populate agency leadership with members of their own parties. Congress has attempted to 
limit this practice by exercising its appropriations authority. 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (limiting 
payment to recess appointees).  
146. See Breger & Edles, supra note 16, at 1164-81 (discussing chairs’ powers and 
noting that chairs of such bodies often align their agenda with that of their appointing 
President). 
147. Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Independent Agencies and the Unitary 
Executive Debate: An Empirical Critique 4 (Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-04, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1100125. It is important to note that Brown and Canteub do not 
agree with my view of the appointment power. They argue that “unitary executive advocates 
underestimate the degree to which independent agencies frustrate presidential 
accountability.” Id. at 5.  
148. Pursuant to Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, the “‘power of the purse’ lies 
in the Congress.” Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 
271, 278 (1977). Congress exercised this power through the nineteenth century not only 
through its appropriations power, but also through framework legislation regulating fiscal 
flows thorough the federal government. See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 
YALE L.J. 1343, 1364-77 (1988) (discussing the two major pieces of nineteenth century 
framework legislation to exercise control over budgeting). In 1919, the House 
Appropriations Committee established a Select Committee on the Budget that drafted a new 
budget framework that “vested responsibility for the preparation of the budget solely in the 
President and provided for the establishment in his office of a Bureau of the Budget to give 
him technical assistance.” PAUL STUDENSKI & HERMAN E. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES 323 (2d ed. 1963). 
149. Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, tit. II, 42 Stat. 20, 20-23 
(granting greater budgetary powers to the President), amended by Reorganization Act of 
1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, § 201, 53 Stat. 561, 565 (expanding the President’s budgetary 
control to include “any regulatory commission or board”). With the post-1921 shift of 
greater budgetary control to the President, the White House could use its influence over the 
budget to influence and discipline both executive and independent agencies. Cf. Susan 
Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of 
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not all) independent agencies from White House fiscal control.150 Nev-
ertheless, independent agencies such as the Federal Reserve and the 
SEC still “cannot afford to flout the views of the President,” who con-
tinues to exercise substantial control as a consequence of his effective 
power of the purse.151 To date, it is worth noting, few agencies have 
been endowed with both budgetary independence and good-cause pro-
tection. The new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau possesses both 
qualities,152 a status that might be thought to conduce an unusual degree 
of autonomy.153  
 Regulatory control: Regulatory control by the White House of agency 
rulemaking is secured through an executive order that compels agencies 
to submit certain proposed rules to the Office of Information and Regu-
latory Affairs (OIRA) for review.154 Independent agencies do not need 
ex ante approval for regulations, but still must submit regulatory plans 
to OIRA annually.155 Presidents have also long taken the view that they 
could bring independent agencies under greater OIRA supervision.156 
Indeed, President Clinton amended the executive order pursuant to 
which OIRA operates to extend the White House’s coordination  
 
the Debate, 1988 DUKE L.J. 223, 233-34 (discussing the Reagan Administration’s efforts in 
this regard). For a discussion that emphasizes the President’s power to channel spending to 
political allies through these means, see Christopher R. Berry et al., The President and the 
Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 783, 787-88 (2010).  
150. See Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by 
the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 963-64 & n.106 (1980) (noting trend); Note, 
Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The Impact of 
Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 
1829 (2012) (“The recent history of the SEC (specifically, the chairmanship of Arthur Levitt 
from 1993 to 2001) illustrates the primacy of congressional control through the budget and 
the influence of appropriations over independent agencies.”). 
151. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 633-34; see also Haoran Lu, 
Presidential Influence on Independent Commissions: A Case of FTC Staffing Levels, 28 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 51, 51 (1998). 
152. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491(c)(3), 5497(a) (2011) (providing removal protection and 
financial independence). 
153. For an insightful discussion, see Note, supra note 150, at 1840-43. 
154. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 638, 644-48 (1993), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601. Executive orders more generally can be used as instruments of control. See 
Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of 
Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483, 489-98 (1988) (explaining how executive orders 
serve as controlling directives for how members of the executive branch administer federal 
law). 
155. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4, 3 C.F.R. at 642-43. 
156. Strauss, supra note 24, at 592 (“Both President Carter and President Reagan were 
advised . . . that they had authority to include the independents in their executive orders 
promoting economic analysis of proposed rules as an element of regulatory reform.”); see 
also Barkow, supra note 136, at 31 (“It is an open constitutional question whether the 
President could require traditional independent agencies . . . to submit cost-benefit analyses 
of proposed regulations to OIRA for review.”). 
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mandate to independent agencies.157 There is also an argument, albeit 
not one uniformly endorsed, that “the President has the legal authority 
to dictate the substance of regulatory decisions entrusted by statute to 
agency heads.”158 Finally, in August 2012, Senator Rob Portland intro-
duced into the Senate a bill entitled the Independent Agency Regulatory 
Analysis Act of 2012 that would have extended OIRA review to inde-
pendent agencies by statute.159  
 “Presidential administration”: Presidents exercise significant directive 
influence on agencies’ policy decisions even without formal decisional 
override power. In addition to leveraging the ample public prestige of 
the White House to “jawbone” agencies,160 Presidents also use 
preregulatory directives in the form of official memoranda and 
postregulatory statements to claim “ownership” of agency decisions. 
These tactics have been labeled by then-Professor Kagan “presidential 
administration.”161  
 Litigation authority: Although independent agencies usually determine 
their own litigation positions before lower courts,162 it is increasingly 
common for Supreme Court briefs on behalf of the federal government 
 
157. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. at 642; Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A 
New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1507 (2002) (discussing President Clinton’s change). 
158. Robert V. Percival, Who’s In Charge? Does the President Have Directive 
Authority over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2488, 2538 
(2011) (noting that most scholars do not believe that the President has this authority); Nina 
A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over Agency Action, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2457-58 (2011) (noting that then-Professor Elena Kagan has argued 
that “a reasonable interpretive principle is to understand a delegation [of authority] to an 
executive branch agency as Congress leaving open, rather than foreclosing, the possibility of 
presidential directive authority”). 
159. See Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, S. 3468, 112th Cong. 
§ 3(c) (as introduced by Sen. Robert Portman, Aug. 1, 2012). At the time of this writing, this 
bill has not been enacted into law.  
160. Verkuil, supra note 150, at 943 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the 
practice). Informal contacts may be an important channel for threats of removal, permitting 
the President to have more direct pre-removal influence. Id. at 957 (“To be effective, the 
power to remove must imply the lesser power to counsel subordinates privately and to 
consult before the axe falls.”). Interestingly, empirical evidence suggests that formal 
presidential statements have an aversive effect on agencies. B. Dan Wood & Richard W. 
Waterman, The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 497, 524 
(1993) (“Presidential statements alter the tone of executive-bureaucratic relations to produce 
movements that suggest a reaction against, rather than a response to, presidential 
influence.”). 
161. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2250, 2290-
99, 2301-02 (2001).  
162. See generally Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General 
Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 278-79 (1994) 
(identifying and discussing various arrangements for some independent agency control over 
litigation efforts). 
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to be filed jointly with the Solicitor General, who functions to some ex-
tent as a vehicle for White House control over federal agencies.163 Even 
where an agency has independent litigation authority, moreover, the So-
licitor General has the power to lodge a brief opposing that agency’s 
views in federal court, thereby effectuating some measure of presiden-
tial control.164 As a consequence, the White House exercises considera-
ble control in the most important tier of legal disputes. There is no rea-
son, beyond easily remedied capacity constraints, why the Solicitor 
General could not take greater control of litigation in the courts of ap-
peals.  
 Controlling interactions between agencies: Presidents promulgate rules 
regulating interagency interactions in complex regulatory areas so as to 
amplify White House control of policy outcomes.165 The White House 
here follows a congressional strategy of tasking one agency with “lob-
bying” another to secure policy outcomes that are not necessarily the 
second agency’s priority.166 Such interagency interactions are feasible 
because of ubiquitous overlap in existing regulatory entities’ jurisdic-
tions.167 Complicating the picture, the same sort of jurisdictional com-
plexity may also function as a barrier to presidential control if Congress 
uses “administrative diversity and fragmentation . . . to insulate new 
administrative agencies from political control.”168 
 Reorganization authority: Presidents have often exercised broad power 
to reorganize the federal bureaucracy to achieve policy goals they can-
not secure through existing structures. For example, the National Secu-
rity Agency, the Welfare Administration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms are all creatures of executive fiat.169 A 2002 
study found that fifty-eight percent of entities obtain a line in the  
 
163. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 145, at 497 tbl.1 (reporting almost uniform 
practice of filing joint agency-Solicitor General briefs from 1995 to 2004); see also 
Bressman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 644-45 (explaining how the Solicitor General can 
overrule the SEC’s view of what position to take in litigation). To be sure, the Solicitor 
General also has a reputation for independence from political control, but this only 
occasionally matters in White House-agency conflicts. During the Carter Administration, for 
example, Attorney General Griffin Bell defended agency prerogatives against White House 
control. Breger & Edles, supra note 16, at 1161.  
164. See examples developed in Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but Not Defending) 
‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1031-34 (2012). 
165. See Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745, 
748 (2011).  
166. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
2217, 2221 (2005). 
167. See Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 185, 218-44 
(2011). 
168. LEWIS, supra note 31, at 9. 
169. William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. POL. 
1095, 1096-97 (2002). 
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presidentially created legislative budget.170 This suggests that unilateral 
presidential action has significant stickiness. It is, however, arguable 
that the White House no longer possesses authority over agency crea-
tion and redesign. Between 1932 and 1984, federal statutes endowed the 
White House explicitly with such power.171 Federal statutory law no 
longer empowers the President in this way. Even in the absence of reor-
ganization authority, Presidents can in the alternative appoint White 
House-based “czars” with directive or hortatory influence over policy 
outcomes. This trend, much remarked upon during President Barack 
Obama’s administration, seems to have substituted for the historical use 
of White-House-based task forces, such as former Vice President Rich-
ard Cheney’s “energy task force” and Vice President Dan Quayle’s 
Council on Competitiveness.172 
This list is long, but not necessarily comprehensive. It shows that removal 
is not the only mechanism available to a political principal seeking influence 
over a bureaucratic agent. Many other alternatives exist. Most are available 
whether an agency is denominated independent or executive.173 And some, 
such as the power over commission chairs, are available only with respect to 
independent agencies. 
Given the observed varieties of political control technologies, Free  
Enterprise Fund’s insistence on removal as central to agency control is hardly 
self-evident. It instead calls for closer investigation. 
 
170. Id. at 1097.  
171. See HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33441, EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
REORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 3-4 (2008), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33441.pdf (documenting history of statutory 
authorizations for presidential reorganization authority). 
172. Consider President Obama’s appointments to two White House offices created 
during his administration: Tom Daschle as the head of an Office of Health Reform and Carol 
Browner as head of the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy. Aaron J. 
Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2577-78 (2011). On the energy task force, see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. 
Court, 542 U.S. 367, 373 (2004). On the Quayle task force, see PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY 
ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 94 (2002). 
Such White House bodies intervene directly in discrete regulatory decisions. For example, 
one of the Council on Competitiveness’s first major interventions involved disapproval of an 
EPA rule banning incineration of lead acid batteries and requiring recycling of a quarter of 
waste streams by municipal incinerators. Michael Weisskopf, EPA Proposal on Recycling Is 
Trashed: White House Panel Opposes Agency Plan, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1990, at A17. 
173. Some are currently not used against independent agencies (for example, regulatory 
review by OIRA) but are in theory available. Cf. Strauss, supra note 24, at 593 (“The 
President’s effective power over the independents would counsel against excluding his 
concerns even if political loyalties did not command attention.”). 
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B. The Removal Power in Institutional Context 
Situating the removal power within a larger array of political control 
mechanisms reveals two threshold reasons for doubting its centrality. First, the 
marginal effect of judicial enforcement of presidential removal authority is not 
fixed. Its magnitude depends instead on the available substitute mechanisms of 
control at the time of a court’s intervention. Second, interaction effects between 
removal authority and other control mechanisms may have perverse, unintend-
ed effects inconsistent with the Court’s North Star of democratic accountabil-
ity.  
It is important, at the threshold, to emphasize that my point in this Subpart 
is not that Presidents never remove any executive branch officials. It is surely 
possible to diagnose some cases of resignation, for example, as de facto fir-
ings,174 such that the mere observation of low rates of removal would not be 
probative. Rather, my aim in this following Subpart is to raise doubts about the 
presumptive centrality of removal as an instrument of presidential control. 
1. Variable marginal effects 
The variety of viable presidential control mechanisms strongly suggests 
that the marginal effect of eliminating statutory for-cause protection in favor of 
White House supervision is not constant but will instead vary dramatically de-
pending on ex ante institutional specifications. A focus on marginal effects 
does not undermine wholly the intuition that removal is pivotal to political con-
trol—but it attaches a significant asterisk.  
Recall first that Free Enterprise Fund conceptualizes political control as a 
binary variable.175 Either it is present in the form of removal authority or it is 
wholly absent. Binary characterization of political control allowed the Court to 
ignore other mechanisms of political control. But this is too simplistic. The co-
existence and overlap of various oversight mechanisms means that control is 
not a discrete, dichotomous variable but a continuous one with diverse etiolo-
gies. Its variegated causes operate on different objects via distinct pathways. 
Some control mechanisms, including appointment and removal powers, operate 
upon the officeholder. Others, such as OIRA review, have policies as their fo-
cus. Yet others—think of the reorganization power—target the institutional 
 
174. For example, in April 2012, the Head of the Government Services Administration 
(GSA), Martha Johnson, resigned in the wake of a damning Government Accounting Office 
report on GSA waste. Jonathan Weisman, Agency Administrator Fires Deputies, Then 
Resigns Amid Spending Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2012, at A11, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/us/politics/general-services-administration-chief-
resigns.html. It is very likely that had Johnson not resigned, she would have been 
expeditiously shown to the exit. I am grateful to Anne Joseph O’Connell for drawing this 
example to my attention. 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 73-82. 
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ecology of the bureaucracy. The fact that mechanisms of political control oper-
ate along different causal pathways with wholly different objects suggests these 
mechanisms are cumulative in effect. Elected officials, in other words, can be 
allotted any combination of the control of persons, policies, or even institutions. 
With each additional form of control, the ability to influence policy increases, 
with each tool bringing subtly different forms of influence. Granular tools 
would enable targeted micromanagement, for example, while more molar ones 
would enable broad, low-information-cost control. 
The continuous, multifactor nature of control is reflected in the longstand-
ing uncertainty about the boundary between independent and executive agen-
cies.176 “[O]ne . . . may search both the law and the literature on congressional-
bureaucratic relationships . . . in vain for an indication that the relationships be-
tween these overseers and the agencies var[y] in any regular way in accordance 
with agency structure.”177 If there are too many factors in play to allow some 
binary test for control to work well, it is hard to see why control should be re-
duced exclusively to the removal power. 
Moreover, if control is a continuous—not a binary—variable, it follows 
that the judicial addition of removal authority to a supervising official’s toolkit 
cannot be presumed always to have a transformative effect. For any given 
agency, the magnitude of a removal-promoting decision’s marginal impact will 
be a partial function of what levers an official already possesses to control an 
agency. Roughly speaking, the more tools an official already has, the less dif-
ference removal authority will make. In some cases, judicial installation of re-
moval authority will bolster political control significantly. But in other circum-
stances, the same decision will have a negligible effect because an official 
already has an arsenal of control mechanisms on hand. In short, the marginal 
effect of judicial interventions on the removal power is contingent and highly 
variable.  
Each additional increment of control will also likely be subject to diminish-
ing marginal returns. It seems likely that removal power makes a large differ-
ence if an official has no other mechanisms for controlling an agency. With 
each additional tool the official has before judicial intervention, it seems likely 
that the official will be increasingly indifferent to the additional marginal gain 
in control, if only because elected officials will generally be concerned with on-
ly a subset of sporadic policy decisions by different agencies, rather than hav-
ing an ongoing interest in micromanaging that agency. So a failure to take the 
 
176. See Breger & Edles, supra note 16, at 1136-37 (observing that “notions of 
independence have varied considerably and indeed have often transmigrated substantially”); 
Bressman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 603. 
177. Strauss, supra note 24, at 591; see also Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability 
and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2081-82 (2005) (emphasizing 
how much control of independent agencies even President Carter had prior to Reagan-era 
centralizing reforms, “which tends to contradict the idea that the president must possess the 
removal power in order to exercise control over these agencies”). 
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last few steps to perfect control will have a relatively small effect on an offi-
cial’s ability to shape agency policy decisions.178 The resulting utility function 
of removal power for elected officials will therefore be convex. 
Could courts take account of the complex, continuous nature of control, 
and award removal authority only when its marginal effect exceeds a specific 
threshold of significance? It is hard to see how. Courts are ill-positioned to 
make the sort of nuanced, synoptic judgments about institutional context neces-
sary to assess accurately the effect of adding one increment of political control. 
Nor is it clear how control would even be measured in this enterprise. Should it 
be judged from the perspective of the Oval Office or from the perspective of 
the agencies?179 The choice matters. Agency reactions to the exercise of politi-
cal control may not be instantaneous, since agencies may be uncertain as to the 
precise nature of the desired policy, or find it difficult to change course quick-
ly.180 What an agent perceives as a timely response, however, may be con-
strued as obstreperous foot-dragging by a principal.  
The facts of the Free Enterprise Fund case only further undermine confi-
dence in the Court’s ability to assess accurately the marginal value of its inter-
ventions. In his dissent, Justice Breyer highlighted evidence that expanding 
SEC control of the accounting board would have no marginal effect on the 
PCAOB’s behavior because of the ample de facto authority already exercised 
by the Commission through appointment powers, budgetary powers, and con-
trol of investigations.181 The majority’s formalist approach meant it saw no 
need to respond to Justice Breyer’s empirical argument. Whether or not Justice 
Breyer was correct, it should be troubling that the majority did not even 
acknowledge the problem of variable marginal effects. This means lower courts 
wishing to employ removal as a proxy for political control have no guidance in 
grappling with the complex institutional ecology questions precedent to the 
 
178. Are there counterexamples in which the President would value the incremental 
change allowing perfect control as much as the initial incremental unit allowing a first 
measure of control? It is hard to conjure examples.  
179. For an argument that the agency perspective should prevail, see Lisa Schultz 
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the 
Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2010) (arguing that “agency 
insiders are the right people to ask about the messages they receive from the White House”). 
180. There is evidence that agencies do not respond immediately to presidentially or 
congressionally initiated budgetary shifts, even when those constitute “powerful signals” of 
politically desirable reorientation. See Daniel P. Carpenter, Adaptive Signal Processing, 
Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 283, 285, 
296-98 (1996) (identifying signaling function of budgets and lagged responses by the FCC 
and the FDA). 
181. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3173 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the SEC’s powers over PCAOB). Recall that the 
SEC appointed the PCAOB’s board, approved its budget, and examined its records as 
necessary and appropriate. Further, PCAOB’s mundane operations were subject to close 
SEC control because the latter had to endorse the Board’s decisions as to whether to compel 
document production or testimony. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67. 
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project of promoting democratic accountability. And it means that it cannot be 
said with confidence that a given judicial intervention in favor of increased 
presidential removal authority will have any meaningful effect on the magni-
tude of presidential control. At least sometimes, it seems likely that the effect 
of judicial intervention will be nugatory.  
2. Interaction effects  
The assumption that adding removal to the White House’s toolkit neces-
sarily increases presidential power also ignores the potential for interaction ef-
fects between different levers of political control. Interaction effects in complex 
government bureaucracies arise when “the fates of units and their relations with 
others are strongly influenced by interactions at other places.”182 Such inter-
connectedness “can defeat purposive behavior” because the immediate and 
predicted consequences of a reform may be outweighed by more indirect and 
less predictable downstream effects.183 In particular, institutional designers 
must look not only to the immediate effects of a proposed change, but also cast 
an eye downstream to ask how other elements in the system will respond stra-
tegically to a change. 
There are two relevant complications—the result of interaction effects and 
strategic responses—that suggest judicial intervention may generate less, not 
more, White House control. A substantial possibility of either one casts doubt 
on the assumed linearity of the removal-to-political-control relationship.  
The first problem arises because adding removal authority to a President’s 
arsenal may change the incentives of agency officials in ways that make 
achievement of a President’s agenda less likely. The intuition is as follows. 
Once the President has removal authority (say, as a result of judicial interven-
tion), risk-averse bureaucrats trim their sails even when pursuing an incumbent 
White House’s agenda because they anticipate the possibility of future regime 
change. That is, the possibility of removal increases the potential downstream 
cost of staking out policy positions far from the political median, and as a con-
sequence dampens bureaucrats’ ardor on projects that, at least in some instanc-
es, will conform to a given President’s policy agenda. 
Bureaucrats can be plausibly modeled with only a pinch of stereotyping as 
having long time horizons and low discount rates. As a result, the fact of tighter 
presidential control means that they must attend not only to current preferences, 
but also account for the possibility of later change at the White House that 
would render their past exertions politically distasteful. If they wish to remain 
at their posts regardless of shifting political fortunes, agency officials who oth-
erwise would aggressively pursue a President’s agenda will, under a regime of 
 
182. ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 17 
(1997).  
183. Id. at 18. 
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broad presidential removal authority, hold back at the margin out of concern 
that a subsequent President may exercise that removal authority to change the 
composition of agency leadership.184 Bureaucrats, in other words, will decline 
to take as many risks on outlying policies. By contrast, if the agency is buffered 
from political change, it may be easier for an otherwise eager bureaucrat to 
promote a policy sought by a like-minded White House without fear of future 
retaliation.185 As a result, in the short term—which is the only time frame that 
matters to a term-limited official such as the President—removal can dampen 
the ability of elected officials to secure desired policy actions.  
It is hard to know in advance, to be sure, whether Presidents will find this 
ideologically dampening mechanism desirable or a hindrance. Sometimes, 
Presidents’ policy goals may converge with those of moderate agencies. Other 
times, a President may welcome the opportunity to work with an agency that is 
unconcerned with later retribution. Yet other times, that same agency may be a 
barrier to presidential policy ambitions. Notwithstanding this variance, the im-
portant point here is that removal authority has ambiguous and contingent ef-
fects on presidential policy ambitions. Its relationship to White House control, 
in short, is not as linear as the Free Enterprise Fund Court implies.  
The second problem arises through dynamic selection effects. It is not only 
the threshold criteria for selecting government officials that influences the pool 
of applicants for a job opening. Back-end rules regulating employment also 
change that pool. For example, official immunity against tort liability for con-
stitutional violations might encourage risk-averse candidates to apply for gov-
ernment jobs or might select for those who enjoy violating the rights of oth-
ers.186 In a similar vein, robust presidential removal authority may foster 
deleterious selection effects. Potential bureaucrats come in many stripes, from 
 
184. There is often in institutional design a “tradeoff between impartiality and 
motivation or energy.” ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN WRIT SMALL 62 (2007). Removal sharpens the incentive to respond to political 
motivations, and as such might undercut impartiality. This is clearly a concern with respect 
to agencies that engage in adjudications. Indeed, the Free Enterprise Fund Court excluded 
such agencies from its analysis. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10. Impartiality, 
however, is valuable not only when agency officials are engaged in adjudication. On many 
policy matters—think of estimates of future national security threats—a rational policymaker 
may wish for impartiality over influence. An advocate of mandatory removal authority, of 
course, may reject this argument by saying the loss of impartiality is a necessary cost of the 
democratic control mandated by the Constitution. 
185. The possibility of such bureaucratic hedging may be a function of presidential 
control mechanisms that focus on persons and not policies. This may be a reason for the 
White House to prefer policy-focused, not people-focused, mechanisms.  
186. VERMEULE, supra note 140, at 106-07. Following one of Vermeule’s models, I 
assume here “that the pool of officeholders changes over time, that officials’ motivations are 
heterogeneous, and that those motivations are at least in part an endogenous product of the 
selection process.” Id. at 115. 
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the power-hungry empire builder to the policy zealot to the wastrel slacker.187 
Different removal rules influence which among these types applies to a bureau-
cratic post. Strong presidential removal authority signals to prospective appli-
cants that their tenure will be more, rather than less, subject to scrutiny on tran-
sient partisan grounds. It is plausible to posit that candidates with deeper 
expertise on a policy issue will be less likely to apply for such positions. At the 
margin, they may prefer positions in the lobbying and advocacy domains in 
which they could express their preferences more candidly, especially if they 
cannot be certain that potential political superiors will always be sympathetic to 
their views. As a result, a position subject to plenary presidential removal au-
thority may be less likely to attract qualified, highly skilled candidates than one 
insulated from such potentially partisan control. In this way, a judicial ruling 
endowing the President with removal authority can paradoxically prove self-
defeating from the perspective of a White House seeking to effectuate policy 
outcomes. If the effect of diminishing the appointment power’s utility is greater 
than the gain obtained from increased removal authority, the net consequence 
of the latter may be negative.  
Both the dampening effect and the dynamic selection effect suggest that 
the question whether an increase in presidential removal authority augments or 
diminishes White House control of an agency cannot be answered in the ab-
stract. Rather, it all depends on the empirics of a given case. This means that 
Presidents will not always welcome judicial promotion of presidential removal 
authority. On occasion, the latter may convey to the voting public an impres-
sion of more fulsome presidential control than in fact is the case. When a White 
House wishes to communicate clearly the limitations upon its ability to secure 
policy goals, judicial insistence on presidential removal authority may well 
have the perverse effect of distorting perceptions of political accountability in 
ways that render elections less accurate as retrospective judgments on politi-
cians’ performance. This would not be a problem if judges were well situated to 
sift background circumstances to gauge accurately the effect of endowing the 
President with removal power. But the specific facts of Free Enterprise Fund 
amply show that judges are ill-equipped or ill-disposed to make accurate judg-
ments of the marginal effect of promoting presidential removal authority. At 
the very least, these arguments demonstrate that it cannot be said that removal 
is necessarily a central tool in a President’s arsenal. Pressed further, they are a 
first rupture in the causal chain between removal and democratic  
accountability. 
 
187. See Ronald Wintrobe, Modern Bureaucratic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC 
CHOICE 429, 429-39 (Dennis C. Mueller, ed., 1997) (identifying different theories of 
bureaucratic behavior). 
HUQ 65 STAN. L. REV. 1.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2012 10:17 AM 
January 2013] REMOVAL AS A POLITICAL QUESTION 39 
C. Theorizing Removal’s Limits  
Free Enterprise Fund’s equation of removal and control suffers a further 
deficiency. As a method of exercising control over an agent, removal is simply 
not all it is cracked up to be. Removal may not only be unnecessary given the 
extant instruments of agency control wielded by a supervising official; it may 
also be ineffectual because it is too costly, too clumsy, and too molar a tool for 
attaining desired policy results. As a result of these limitations, even a supervis-
ing official who has no other instruments of agency control will not necessarily 
find her ability to elicit desirable policy outcomes increased in any meaningful 
way by a judicial intervention reallocating removal power. Accordingly, for a 
court to treat removal as a unique Archimedean lever that can move the bu-
reaucratic world would be quixotic. Again, where removal authority is a nuga-
tory addition to the presidential arsenal because of its costs, judicial action in 
the vein of Free Enterprise Fund may have the perverse effect of creating a 
semblance of presidential control where little exists, thereby hindering, rather 
than advancing, democratic accountability. This Subpart explains the theoreti-
cal basis for this counterintuitive claim. The following Subpart supplies empiri-
cal support for it.  
Developing the limitations on removal power, I draw again on the econom-
ic literature on agency costs. Specifically, that literature identifies information 
asymmetries and transaction costs as reasons to believe that removal will be a 
systematically less attractive control device in comparison to other generally 
available tools such as the appointment power.188 
1. Information asymmetries  
The principal-agent literature identifies informational asymmetries as an 
important constraint on principals’ ability to police agency slack ex post. Prin-
cipals typically face two asymmetries that make removal an unreliable crutch: 
hidden information and hidden action problems.189 Hidden information prob-
lems arise when an agent knows more about the exogenous conditions that af-
fect output independent of effort than the principal.190 Hidden action problems 
 
188. This is not to say that other control mechanisms do not also have costs. For 
example, “presidents can get into very deep trouble when they do end-runs around the 
bureaucracy,” or alternatively “when command replaces deliberation.” Joel D. Aberbach & 
Bert A. Rockman, Mandates or Mandarins? Control and Discretion in the Modern 
Administrative State, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 606, 610 (1988). So “presidential administration” 
at least is no panacea. 
189. John D. Huber & Charles R. Shipan, The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, 
and Transaction Costs, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 25, 27-28 (2000); see also BREHM & GATES, 
supra note 135, at 25-26; Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND 
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 
1985). 
190. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 35 n.63 (1988). 
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arise when (1) agents’ effort cannot be directly observed and (2) outcomes are 
imperfectly correlated with effort.191 Under either set of conditions, a princi-
pal’s use of removal alone will be suboptimal because the principal will not be 
able to discern accurately the class of cases in which the agent should be ousted 
for failing to follow instructions as opposed to cases in which the agent has 
fallen short for exogenous reasons out of his control. 
Both kinds of epistemic asymmetries occur frequently in public bureaucra-
cies. Agencies often possess more information about external conditions that 
bear on the optimal selection and performance of policy instruments. Presidents 
are often unable to ascertain independently whether a given policy failure is 
caused by agency slack or by an external constraint. Further, agency officials 
frequently possess subject-specific skills and knowledge that the White House 
lacks.192 Given either kind of informational asymmetry, Presidents’ exercise of 
the removal power will be imprecise. Vigorous use of removal risks being 
overbroad, while its parsimonious employment will be underinclusive.193 More 
generally, it will not always be the case that a bureaucrat’s task will lend itself 
to the formulation of “detailed instructions,”194 such that a White House prin-
cipal can ascertain compliance after the fact.  
Attention to information asymmetries again underscores the virtues of al-
ternatives to removal. In particular, it is plausible that the appointment power 
will in fact often have lower epistemic costs. As employers can identify desira-
ble candidates by their qualifications and achievements in the private job mar-
ket context, so the White House can screen potential appointees to mitigate the 
need for later supervision and discipline. Partisan cues, past employment, and 
formal qualifications all provide information about preference alignment at the 
appointments stage. Such information may be easier to obtain and interpret than 
the noisy signals about agency performance upon which removal decisions rest. 
Of course, Presidents’ appointment power is tempered by the Senate’s confir-
mation role. But empirical evidence suggests that the White House still wields 
considerable influence.195  
 
191. Cf. Moe, supra note 129, at 755 (distinguishing problems that arise when a 
principal lacks knowledge of an agent’s type or an agent’s behavior). 
192. Indeed, it may be that elected officials and their agents are effectively embedded 
within a bilateral monopoly situation because of asset-specific epistemic and skill 
investments, in which either can hold up the other. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 90-
91 (1985) (describing the hold-up problem in bilateral contracts). 
193. Canonical contractual solutions such as assignment of residual profits to one of 
several agents or the use of interagent competition do not necessarily fit the public 
administration context. Moe, supra note 129, at 763. 
194. Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative 
Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 590 (2011).  
195. A 2009 study, though, attributes almost three-quarters of the delay in filling vacant 
offices to nomination lags as opposed to confirmation delays. Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 966-67 
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In sum, informational asymmetries between a President and an agency im-
pose a cap on the value of removal authority. Whether or not the power to se-
lect in a given case is available, there will be a subset of cases in which a Presi-
dent’s inability to observe directly an official’s actions imposes a constraint on 
her ability to use (or even credibly threaten) removal in a way that provokes de-
sirable actions. In those cases, it is not clear that removal does much work.  
2. Transaction costs  
The second cluster of reasons to think the appointment power will system-
atically dominate the removal power as a tool of presidential control turns on 
transaction costs. These frictional costs come in several forms: political costs, 
costs to agency performance, epistemic costs, and harmful dynamic effects.  
First and most importantly, the political costs of removal may negate its 
utility from the White House’s perspective. Recent accounts of the presidency 
have emphasized that it is not so much legal constraints, but the need to main-
tain favorable “public opinion,” that curbs executive discretion.196 “Without 
credibility,” it is claimed, “the president is a helpless giant.”197 Although some 
formulations of this claim may be somewhat overstated,198 it is surely the case 
that Presidents are highly sensitive to the perception of their actions in the elec-
torate, and to what might be termed the political costs of a given action. Indeed, 
it is hardly implausible to think that Presidents will frequently be more sensi-
tive to political costs than to policy outcomes.  
Removal often has large political costs, and these may render it an ineffec-
tual supplement to the President’s arsenal.199 Removal is a high-profile means 
of influencing policy outcomes in comparison to tools such as presidential ad-
ministration, reorganization, and litigation control. Its use may draw public  
 
(2009). Although this suggests floor fights on confirmations are less significant than 
commonly believed, it cannot settle the relative influence of the Senate and the President. 
Large nomination delays may reflect Presidents’ efforts to identify candidates who conform 
to Senate preferences or may indicate time-consuming searches for technically qualified 
candidates. 
196. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 61, 209-10 (2010). 
197. Id. at 153. Posner and Vermeule here are ably tapping an idea that goes back to 
Richard Neustadt, who focused on Presidents’ “power to persuade” as central to their 
success. See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: 
THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 10 (rev. ed. 1990). 
198. My own view is that the scope of presidential authority is a complex function of 
exogenous political and legal forces, such that dichotomous labels of “strong” and “weak” 
may be misleading. See Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 777, 781-83 (2012) (reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 196) 
(developing a theory of when Presidents are confined either by legal or political constraints). 
199. See Magill, supra note 139, at 39 (“Removal of an official is also more constrained 
by political considerations than some other mechanisms Presidents can rely on to exert their 
control.”). 
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attention to the fact that a chief executive is attempting to control policy against 
the wishes of expert agency leadership. Hence, it creates political costs for the 
President.200 Consequent transaction costs may be so great in some cases that it 
is the agent, not the principal, who exercises larger de facto control. By way of 
illustration, consider the threat in March 2004 by a group of senior Justice De-
partment officials to resign unless changes were made to then-ongoing elec-
tronic surveillance programs.201 President George W. Bush’s decision to back 
down on a program he apparently believed to be central to national security can 
plausibly be ascribed to the political costs of being seen to have constructively 
dismissed senior officials with area-specific expertise. The political costs of de 
facto removal provided subordinates with a lever to prevail against White 
House influence. This suggests that a subset of cases exists in which transaction 
costs effectively insulate an official from presidential control by removal. To 
the extent that appointees are aware that political costs sometimes preclude ef-
fective presidential action via removal, a judicial decision awarding the remov-
al power to the White House is ineffectual in terms of the Free Enterprise Fund 
Court’s putative goal of democratic accountability.  
Attention to political costs might suggest that the judicial allocation of re-
moval to the White House might not always improve the President’s position, 
but it also does not show that the addition of removal power makes him worse 
off. On this view, judicial addition of removal authority to the presidential 
toolkit is warranted on the ground that, at least in some set of cases, it will be 
useful in promoting White House control and thereby democratic accountabil-
ity. At a minimum, the threat of removal (even without its execution) will have 
a salutary effect on the distribution of policy control within the executive.  
But this moves too quickly. Removal, even if not employed, can have a se-
cond set of transaction costs that undermine a President’s ability to secure de-
sirable policy actions. The Free Enterprise Fund rule may thus not merely be 
nugatory, but sometimes positively harmful by fostering a false impression of 
White House suzerainty that misleads voters.  
Recent empirical work in social psychology finds that “authorities and in-
stitutions that exercised authority fairly and that communicated sincere and be-
nevolent intentions encouraged their members to develop supportive disposi-
tions.”202 The use or threat of removal undermines supportive dispositions. It 
thereby risks rendering agencies across the board less effective in their  
 
200. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 359 (1982) (“[A]gency heads 
in practice have considerable autonomy, for presidents are unwilling to fire a major public 
official except over a very important matter.”). 
201. See BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 305-14 (2008) 
(recounting the incident). 
202. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS 167 
(2011). Tom Tyler’s study includes both workplaces and governmental institutions. That is, 
it is not limited to those institutional contexts in which individuals might be expected to 
anticipate pro-social behavior by others. 
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appointed tasks. Moreover, the availability of an effective removal power may 
impose costs in terms of diluted agency initiative and a diminished willingness 
to use expertise.203 It is, indeed, well documented that eliminating agency dis-
cretion decreases the incentives of agencies to acquire information and take 
policy initiatives.204 “[B]ureaucratic expertise is endogenous, costly, and rela-
tionship specific”; it will be developed only when government induces its 
agents to invest in relationship-specific skills by granting job security and 
“some measure of control.”205 Any effectual increase in control, in short, has a 
price. It reduces the internal stock of epistemic capital within the administration 
that is often necessary to secure policy goals. There is no a priori reason to be-
lieve, moreover, that the loss in terms of agency expertise, initiative, and sup-
port will be offset by any gains associated with increased presidential control.  
A third, but related, transaction cost merits highlighting: the epistemic 
costs of removing an official. There is a tendency to view the President as a 
unitary actor. Today, however, the White House is now a sprawling and com-
plex bureaucracy. Each new administration faces correspondingly high start-up 
costs. When a new President enters the Oval Office for the first time, “it is 
empty. . . . All of the files are gone. Even the secretaries are gone.”206 But the 
demands on the new administration are already bearing down hard.207 Presi-
dents thus pay steep costs in assembling a team, learning policy context, under-
standing bureaucratic structures, and identifying the optimal path to policy out-
comes. It should be no surprise that the White House can find itself reliant on 
permanent agency staff from inauguration day onward.208 Even once a White 
 
203. These costs are likely to vary from agency to agency. One study of the Justice 
Department’s Civil Rights Division and the National Traffic Safety Administration found 
that the efficacy of “presidential control efforts” depended, inter alia, on the extent of 
careerist ideology, professional orientations, and agency esprit de corps. Marissa Martino 
Golden, Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect: Bureaucratic Responses to Presidential Control 
During the Reagan Administration, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 29, 34-35 (1992). 
204. See Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 
105 J. POL. ECON. 1, 3, 27 (1997) (arguing that transferring authority to an agent “will both 
facilitate the agent’s participation in the organization and foster his incentive to acquire 
relevant information about the corresponding activities”). 
205. Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy 
Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 874, 886 (2007).  
206. Martha Joynt Kumar, The White House as City Hall: A Tough Place to Organize, 
31 PRES. STUD. Q. 44, 44 (2001) (quoting Interview by Martha Joynt Kumar and Nancy 
Kassop with Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to President Clinton, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Nov. 9, 
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
207. Id. at 45. 
208. See id. at 51 (emphasizing the importance of internal institutional knowledge for 
an incoming administration). A President’s choice to internalize a decision within the White 
House or allocate it to an agency resembles a firm’s decision whether “the costs of 
organizing within the firm” will be greater or less than “the costs involved in leaving the 
transaction to be ‘organized’ by the price mechanism.” R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, 
AND THE LAW 55 (1988) (describing the internal-versus-external deliberative process for 
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House is up and running, a President may find that the plurality and complexity 
of that institution can generate transaction costs. Different components of the 
White House, that is, may diverge in their policy assessments. Agencies can 
exploit such differences to defer or deflect presidential attention,209 leveraging 
their superior information over executive branch dynamics.  
These dynamics suggest that the use of removal authority diminishes the 
internal epistemic stock of an administration in ways that might preclude suc-
cessful policymaking quite apart from its effect on agency performance. If ex-
pertise is at a premium, especially in the first hundred days of an administration 
when Presidents tend to be both most able and most interested in achieving pol-
icy change, then an institutional design modification that dissipates expertise in 
order to obtain control may be an unhelpful tool for chief executives. Further, if 
there is a temporal constraint on executive action, removal has the additional 
disadvantage of “disrupt[ing] the action that official oversaw and directed.”210  
These arguments from political, agency performance, and epistemic costs 
of removal may be deepened with another observation: removal typically oper-
ates at one scale and one scale only—a person unit. The President cannot fire a 
policy decision; he or she must fire a person. This means that when an agency 
official has made several decisions, only one of which the President finds ob-
jectionable, removal is by definition an overbroad remedy. The absence of 
granularity in removal means that the political, epistemic, and agency perfor-
mance costs will be all the greater given the spillover effect of a given removal 
decision or threat.  
Finally, a transaction cost critique of removal as a tool of political control 
is confirmed by attending to the dynamic effect of removal on congressional 
incentives. That dynamic perspective reveals yet another strategic response 
problem. A President seeking to use an agency to pursue aggressively a policy 
agenda necessarily depends on Congress for funding. Presidential authority to 
remove an agency head might give appropriators pause. Legislators may worry 
that such authority creates the risk that, having secured durable funding, a Pres-
ident might remove an agency head, leaving in place a deputy or recess appoin-
tee more sympathetic to the White House.211 In anticipation, limits on removal 
 
firms). Presidents, unlike firms, will look to the political costs and benefits of control rather 
than to profits.  
209. See, e.g., Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 179, at 69 (“The EPA used other 
White House offices to combat OIRA, and other offices and agencies used OIRA to combat 
the EPA.”). 
210. Magill, supra note 139, at 38-39. 
211. See Nolan McCarty, The Appointments Dilemma, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 413, 414 
(2004); Daniel F. Spulber & David Besanko, Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory 
Mandate, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 126, 133-38 (1992) (identifying the same potential 
commitment strategy). Note that Presidents, especially in their second terms, may cease to be 
repeat players, such that they are more willing to renege on deals embedded in 
appropriations measures. Or Presidents might bet on changes to the composition of Congress 
in midterm elections. 
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power “increase the ability of presidents to commit not to politicize the agency 
either through replacements or threats of removal” and thereby increase Presi-
dents’ capacity to commit to certain policy courses.212 Once more, that is, stra-
tegic responses to judicial interventions complicate the case for presidential 
removal power. 
D. Empirical Evidence of the Removal Power’s Limits 
These limits on removal’s efficacy are not merely theoretical. Empirical, 
historical, and comparative evidence shows that removal in practice can be an 
ineffectual control tool. I draw here on historical and contemporary data from 
the United States, comparative evidence from the United Kingdom (where 
chief executives have long wielded untrammeled power to remove all heads of 
department), and evidence from the private law context of employment con-
tracting. These three sources of evidence suggest it may be unwise to relegate 
nonremoval control mechanisms to the scrap heap of “bureaucratic  
minutiae.”213  
1. Historical and contemporary U.S. evidence  
We profitably begin with history. History matters because it demonstrates 
how much the achievement of policy goals depends on agency initiative and 
expertise—qualities that are diminished by the availability of removal authori-
ty. The historical path of the American regulatory state also suggests that for-
mal powers such as removal are not the main vector for the exercise of bureau-
cratic influence.  
At its inception, the now-familiar federal regulatory state was a product of 
mid-tier bureaucratic initiative as much as White House pressure. Notwith-
standing inklings of an administrative state through the republic’s first century, 
it was only in the Progressive Era that the national state moved from “an ingen-
uous extraconstitutional framework of courts and parties” to a true “national 
bureaucracy.”214 Presidents certainly played an important role in that transfor-
mation,215 but bureaucratic expansion was also the work of entrepreneurial 
 
212. McCarty, supra note 211, at 423. 
213. Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 
(2010). 
214. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 287 (1982). 
215. See id. at 169-76 (summarizing the roles of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, 
William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson in state formation). Congressional politics also 
played an important role in making bureaucratic expansion possible. See SCOTT C. JAMES, 
PRESIDENTS, PARTIES, AND THE STATE: A PARTY SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE ON DEMOCRATIC 
REGULATORY CHOICE, 1884-1936, at 7-9 (2000) (identifying internal shifts in the Democratic 
Party’s ideology and political goals as a result of congressional elections as key to the 
expansion of the Progressive Era state).  
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mid-level bureaucrats who made vocal claims on fiscal and legal resources, 
built independent support networks among the public, and pressured Congress 
into establishing new bureaucratic institutions.216 It was not independent agen-
cies that led this institutional growth.217 Rather, it was executive agency offi-
cials such as Gifford Pinchot and Harvey Wiley within the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture who propelled it.218 Even though these catalysts of bureaucratic 
growth worked inside executive agencies, they did not act at the White House’s 
behest. To the contrary, Presidents had to be “spurred”219 into action and some-
times offered “resistance” to mid-level bureaucrats’ empire-building initia-
tives.220 Rather than depending on fickle presidential leadership, bureaucrats 
employed “a politics of legitimacy” in which “agency leaders buil[t] reputa-
tions for their organizations—reputations for efficacy, for uniqueness of ser-
vice, for moral protection, and for expertise”221—and used those reputations to 
secure institutional resources.  
This historical trajectory is important not solely because it shows the im-
portance of agency expertise and initiative—values that removal dissipates. It 
also suggests that the capacity for independent action by an agency, whether 
denominated as independent or executive, has never been a simple function of 
tenure rules. The foundation of bureaucratic autonomy lies not in formal legal 
relationships, but in informal networks, norms, and reputations. Given this his-
tory, it seems unlikely that Presidents would rely solely on legal-institutional 
tools such as removal to control such agencies.222 Consistent with this interpre-
tation, there is relatively scant evidence that Presidents persistently use, or 
threaten to use, their good-cause removal authority, which can be read quite 
aggressively,223 to maximize control over agency officials.  
 
216. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: 
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928, at 
260-85, 353-62 (2001) (summarizing the development of bureaucratic autonomy through 
congressional lobbying, the fostering of “long-lasting national esteem” for agencies, and 
support from the “popular press”). 
217. Id. at 9. 
218. See id. at 255-89 (describing Pinchot’s and Wiley’s groundbreaking efforts to 
expand the power and reach of the USDA). 
219. Id. at 255. 
220. Id. at 271-73 (noting resistance from cabinet officials and Presidents that was 
thwarted by reliance on a “ready-made lobby” among the public).  
221. Id. at 353. 
222. See BREHM & GATES, supra note 135, at 3, 7-9 (summarizing historical research 
that shows the influence of “the bureaucrat’s own preferences, peer bureaucrats, supervisors, 
and the bureaucrat’s clients” on agency work choices). Note that influence by supervisors, 
which would include removal power, is but one of the four potential sources of influence 
over bureaucratic behavior. 
223. See John F. Manning, The Independent Counsel Statute: Reading “Good Cause” 
in Light of Article II, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1285, 1288 (1999) (arguing that “good cause” 
removal provisions with respect to the independent counsel “may authorize . . . removal for 
disobeying the President’s legal directives, at least on matters of reasonably contestable legal 
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Turning to the contemporary American bureaucracy, the available empiri-
cal research confirms that removal is not a significant control tool for the White 
House (even though its use is certainly not unknown).224 As an initial matter, 
political scientists have long been aware that removal is not necessary to bu-
reaucratic control. It has long been “well known that independent regulatory 
commissions are not truly independent of presidential direction and control” on 
the ground.225 Numerous empirical studies of the interaction between the White 
House and independent agencies bear this out. An early study of the NLRB, the 
SEC, and the FTC, for example, found that “measures of regulatory perfor-
mance . . . vary systematically with presidential partisanship.”226 Time-series 
studies looking at both independent and executive agencies also find that policy 
“responsiveness [to partisan change in the White House] permeates the U.S. 
bureaucrac[ies]” regardless of agencies’ tenure regimes.227 While independent 
regulatory commissions generate the “most stable” policy outputs, it is the ini-
tial “political appointment” process that appears to influence policy out-
comes.228 One study looking solely at the notionally independent Federal Re-
serve found that a President’s ability to make appointments was effective in 
“build[ing] consensus” behind policy measures.229 It concluded by finding 
“significant evidence for presidential influence on consensual decision making” 
by the Reserve’s Board of Governors,230 an institution typically thought be-
yond White House control. 
 
judgment”); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986) (describing good-cause-
like removal provisions as “very broad”). 
224. Note that the following empirical work may actually underestimate the effects of 
some nonremoval tools, lending further support to my conclusions regarding the efficacy of 
nonremoval control mechanisms. Empirical studies tend to focus on appointments and 
removals as discrete and observable points of political control. Other control mechanisms, 
such as presidential administration and litigation control, tend to receive short shrift because 
they are more difficult to isolate temporally and hence present greater identification 
challenges. Accounting for the full range of presidential controls likely points to an even 
more modest role for removal. 
225. Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 197, 197 (1982); accord Kagan, supra note 161, at 2274 (noting that “in the 
absence of [removal] power, [the President] retains other methods of exerting influence over 
administrative officials”). 
226. Moe, supra note 225, at 197-98. 
227. B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 806, 821 (1991). To be clear, Wood and Waterman 
find that both executive and independent agencies are responsive to some degree to both 
presidential and congressional efforts to direct policy. They offer no finding with respect to 
whether there is any significant differentiation with respect to the degree of each kind of 
responsivenes.  
228. Id. at 822-23. 
229. Gregory A. Krause, Federal Reserve Policy Decision Making: Political and 
Bureaucratic Influences, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 124, 135-36 (1994). 
230. Id. at 140. The study found no analogous influence over the Reserve’s regional 
bank presidents. Id. 
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Intra-agency norms should also influence the choice of political control 
tools. One study of peer effects within federal bureaucracies found that bureau-
crats’ responses to uncertainty turn less on supervisory instructions and more 
upon what they perceive peer bureaucrats to be doing.231 At the same time, 
“intersubordinate contacts” and “[s]olidary preferences were consistently 
strong determinants of the reasons why a subordinate would work.”232 Use of 
the appointment power to stock an agency with like minds up front thus does 
more to dampen agency slack than downstream removal decisions.  
Some political scientists go further. They doubt agency independence is 
possible given the available range of presidential control tools. One recently 
suggested that “the supposed constitutional rule limiting Presidents to mere 
oversight of agencies is incapable of neutrally circumscribing either presiden-
tial or administrative behavior.”233 Given the depth of Presidents’ toolkits to 
stymie agency slack, they argue, the better question to ask is why, if ever, the 
President would not control agencies’ policy directions. That is, they stress rea-
sons why Presidents choose not to influence agency actions so as to escape po-
litical accountability or to attain policy goals that would be frustrated by tight 
political control. 
2. Comparative evidence  
A second approach to gauging the efficacy of removal is comparative.234 
One useful comparator is the United Kingdom, where British prime ministers 
“can appoint and dismiss more or less whomever they like.”235 The Free  
 
231. See BREHM & GATES, supra note 135, at 73-74; id. at 93-108 (using data from 
1979, 1983, and 1992 surveys of federal employees to confirm model). 
232. Id. at 196; see id. at 108 (studying federal bureaucrats and finding that 
“recognition and association with their peers yield strong positive returns for many 
employees”). 
233. Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate over 
Law or Politics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 645 (2010). Other scholars take a diametrically 
opposite view, albeit one that also conduces to treating removal as irrelevant. See BREHM & 
GATES, supra note 135, at 11-12 (“[I]t is largely meaningless to think of agencies as 
organizations under centralized control. The bureaucrats studied . . . exercise wide latitude 
over policy.”).  
234. For an influential comparative analysis of European and American political-
bureaucracy relations, see JOEL D. ABERBACH ET AL., BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS IN 
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 1-23 (1981) (positing four possible models for the interaction and 
suggesting convergence toward a “hybrid” model wherein politicians and bureaucrats 
increasingly resemble each other).  
235. Anthony King & Nicholas Allen, ‘Off with Their Heads’: British Prime Ministers 
and the Power to Dismiss, 40 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 249, 250 (2010); see also R.K. Alderman & 
J.A. Cross, The Reluctant Knife: Reflections on the Prime Minister’s Power of Dismissal, 38 
PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 387, 387 (1985) (describing “a Prime Minister’s virtually absolute 
dominance over his ministerial colleagues”). Like the American government, the British 
government is structured into issue-bundled ministries, each headed by a cabinet official. See 
Nicholas Allen & Hugh Ward, “Moves on a Chess Board”: A Spatial Model of British 
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Enterprise Fund logic of treating removal as the touchstone of control would 
suggest that British prime ministers exercise both broad and deep policy control 
thanks to their authority over Ministers. The British experience, although not 
exactly analogous with the American context, suggests that removal is no  
panacea for a chief executive seeking control over the bureaucracy.  
Prime ministers certainly do exercise their removal authority. Out of 132 
cabinet departures between January 1957 and June 2007, 87 were “dismissed 
outright, resigned pre-emptively or else [were] constructively dismissed.”236 
This is in contrast to the U.S. experience, where removal is a rare occur-
rence.237 But prime ministerial removal authority is still “typically wielded . . . 
with reluctance” such that “exercise of the power may be characterised more by 
discretion than by imperiousness.”238 Obviously, the frictions on prime minis-
terial exercise of dismissal authority cannot be legal. Rather, they reflect re-
moval’s high political transaction costs. Certain of these transaction costs are 
unique to the parliamentary context. Some prime ministers, for example, are 
constrained by a parliamentary coalition, which make them vulnerable to cabi-
net defections in a way that U.S. Presidents are not.239 Prime ministers can also 
be boxed in with the independent political standing of cabinet members, the so-
called “big beasts” of national politics, each of whom has a freestanding reputa-
tion and network.240 Despite the difference in electoral contexts, the U.K. expe-
rience still has some lessons for understanding the U.S. context. 
The British experience demonstrates that major cabinet reshuffles have im-
posed significant costs on prime ministers. Harold Macmillan’s elimination of 
seven cabinet ministers in July 1962—perhaps the most dramatic use of prime 
ministerial power after World War II—induced a “sharp increase in Macmil-
lan’s unpopularity.”241 Macmillan also aggravated the “uncertainty” of his re-
maining cabinet members to “impracticable and counter-productive” effect.242 
Rather than generating loyalty, Macmillan found that removing officials fos-
tered distrust and imposed a friction on his capacity for robust action. Just as 
 
Prime Ministers’ Powers over Cabinet Formation, 11 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 238, 240-41 
(2009).  
236. King & Allen, supra note 235, at 259-60. 
237. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3170 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
238. Alderman & Cross, supra note 235, at 388. 
239. See VERNON BOGDANOR, THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION 128-29 (2009) 
(describing interaction of parliamentary coalitions and cabinet formation during Gordon 
Brown’s Government). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the U.K. government has 
witnessed long periods of stable, one-party government as well as periods of more fluid and 
fragmented coalition building. Id. at 121-22. I could identify no empirical work that 
examined the difference in removal dynamics between these two periods. 
240. King & Allen, supra note 235, at 268-70 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
241. Alderman & Cross, supra note 235, at 393. 
242. Id. at 394. 
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the literature on trust in organizations suggests,243 the aggressive use of remov-
al power erodes beliefs in the fairness of institutions. Post-Macmillan prime 
ministers have internalized this insight and been chary in using the removal 
power.244  
It is important not to read too much into this comparative evidence, which 
concerns only senior officials with linkages to a parliamentary coalition—a 
condition precedent that, it is worth emphasizing again, has no exact analog in 
the American context.245 It is almost certainly the case that the firing of a 
postmaster, even one first-class in rank, is unlikely to attract as much political 
ire as the firing of a cabinet-rank official. Despite incompleteness in the analo-
gy, the British experience nevertheless suggests that precisely when the stakes 
are highest, the President will be most constrained from acting against a puta-
tive subordinate. Further, the British experience hints that the availability of 
removal can be demoralizing in the medium term. These are additional reasons 
to be skeptical about the notion that removal occupies pride of place, or even 
any necessary room, in any chief executive’s administrative toolkit.  
3. Private contracting  
One final source of empirical evidence derives from the private law context 
of employment contracts. At first blush, the well-known dominance of at-will 
arrangements in private contracting seems to cut against the argument that re-
moval is not a significant instrument of control.246 On the other hand, recent 
empirical work demonstrates that an overwhelming number of both the current-
ly employed and those seeking work believe employment to be regulated by a 
just-cause rule.247 Regardless of the regnant legal rule, expectations and prac-
tice are seemingly guided by “the norm” of “no discharge without cause.”248  
 
243. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
244. See Alderman & Cross, supra note 235, at 396-97 (“Churchill found it so 
distasteful that, whenever possible, he did the deed by letter or delegated it to someone 
else . . . . Thatcher . . . described dismissing ministers as something you have to grit your 
teeth to do.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
245. Note though that one way in which Presidents lose or gain support is through the 
credibility vel non of the cabinet officers. One reason to select a former senator as a cabinet 
officer—think of John Ashcroft’s appointment as U.S. Attorney General—is a belief that 
sound relations between departmental heads and legislators will ease the way for presidential 
policy actions. Even in the United States, that is, there is some connection between 
legislative politics and cabinet dynamics.  
246. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment 
Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 867-70 (“Slightly more 
than one-half of all employers (52%) contract explicitly for an at will relationship.”). 
247. See Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending 
Employment At-Will in Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause 
Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 330 (2002) (finding, based on a survey of 
the employed, that “[n]ot only do [employees] not know about or misapply the at-will 
doctrine, they hold beliefs about their current level of legal job security that are simply 
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The best explanation of this evidence is that “[e]mployers already have suf-
ficient incentives to follow a just-cause course of conduct.”249 On the one hand, 
employers can draw on norms and fair treatments to elicit desired conduct from 
employees far more effectively than they can rely on formal hierarchical con-
trols.250 On the other hand, even in an at-will world, discharges are costly in 
terms of transaction costs and demoralization effects.251 The dominance of at-
will contracts, on this account, does not lead to the conclusion that firing is in 
fact a central control mechanism. The infrequency of firing, by contrast, is tell-
ing. As a result, the real lesson of the private contracting comparison is that re-
moval often tends to be superfluous as an instrument of hierarchical control.  
 
*   *   * 
 
There is a commonsense appeal to the notion that removal authority is nec-
essarily useful, and even sometimes vital, to a President seeking to control a 
wayward agency. But theory and evidence from historical, empirical, and com-
parative sources suggest that this intuition should be resisted. The correlation 
between removal authority and control is far weaker than the Free Enterprise 
Fund Court allows. Not only is removal a comparatively ineffectual instrument 
of presidential control, but in some instances judicial promotion of presidential 
removal authority will result in less, rather than more, desirable outcomes for 
the President. Given these dynamics, it should hardly be surprising that Presi-
dents, as Justice Breyer noted, do not always argue for unfettered removal  
authority.252 A rational occupant of the White House will on occasion wish to 
 
wrong”); see also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of 
Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 127-
28, 133 (1997) (finding similar results among a survey population comprised of unemployed 
job seekers). 
248. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the 
Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1930 (1996) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); accord Rudy, supra note 247, at 345-46 (confirming Rock and Wachter’s 
conclusion based on empirical work). 
249. Rudy, supra note 247, at 312. 
250. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 500-01 (1985) (“[T]he oversocialized view that orders 
within a hierarchy elicit easy obedience . . . cannot stand scrutiny against . . . empirical 
studies . . . .”). 
251. Rudy, supra note 247, at 312. 
252. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 
3169-70 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Inspection of the signing statements regarding the 
twenty-four agencies that Justice Breyer lists in his dissent reveals only two instances in 
which a President raised constitutional concerns about limits on a removal power. This 
unwillingness to expend the meager effort necessary to include objections to removal-related 
restrictions in signing statements suggests that Presidents do not see that much utility in the 
removal power.  
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ensure that the public does not misallocate political responsibility due to a false 
belief in the extent of presidential control of agencies.  
These arguments speak directly to the viability of a judicially manageable 
rule based on removal authority. As Part IV will elaborate, they suggest that 
there is only weak reason to believe that when a court intervenes in favor of 
presidential removal authority, it will further presidential control. That means 
that there is only weak reason to believe it will deepen democratic accountabil-
ity. Without a correlation of this kind, the outcomes from the Free Enterprise 
Fund rule of decision seem ad hoc and unprincipled—precisely the result that 
the political question doctrine is meant to forestall. 
III. THE WEAK LINK BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL AND 
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY  
This Part takes up the second element of Free Enterprise Fund’s syllo-
gism: its equation of presidential control with democratic accountability. In the 
Court’s eyes, White House control exercised via the removal power fosters “a 
clear and effective chain of command” over administrative agencies.253 Absent 
presidential control, the Court warned, “the public [cannot] pass judgment on 
[the President’s] efforts” or federal policy consistent with the Constitution’s 
command of democratic accountability.254 Given these premises, the Court’s 
rule also must stand or fall on the strength of the causal connection between 
presidential control and democratic accountability.  
There are three reasons for doubting Free Enterprise Fund’s elegant equa-
tion of presidential control of administrative agencies with democratic account-
ability. First, the Court’s argument again fails to account for potential interac-
tion effects, this time between presidential control and other democratic 
accountability mechanisms. Second, the presidential control / democratic ac-
countability nexus is causally weaker than the Court’s narrative suggests. Am-
plifying presidential control consequently does not create a predictable quan-
tum of greater democratic control of administrative policymaking. Finally, the 
Court’s conception of democratic accountability is too imprecise to do the nec-
essary analytic work. Accountability is a multifaceted and contested idea. 
Augmenting presidential control promotes some kinds of accountability while 
simultaneously undermining others. Without a robust normative description of 
accountability, the Court cannot ascertain what net accountability-related effect 
its interventions will have.  
 
253. Id. at 3155 (majority opinion). 
254. Id. 
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A. Interaction Effects of Presidential Control  
To equate presidential control of agencies with democratic accountability, 
as the Court does, is to downplay or ignore other democratic accountability 
mechanisms within the Constitution. But those other mechanisms might also 
impinge on the control-accountability equation. Other actors in the constitu-
tional framework may, for example, respond strategically to Free Enterprise 
Fund in ways that undermine its effects. Predicting the net effect of any judicial 
intervention therefore requires “an explicit theory of how the president, Con-
gress, bureaucracy, and the courts interact to make public policy.”255 Free En-
terprise Fund offers no such theory. Articulating that theory casts doubt on the 
promajoritarian credentials of presidential control. 
Strategic response effects arise because the Constitution creates plural ave-
nues—not least the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the White 
House—through which public preferences influence bureaucratic actions. Like 
the President, Congress can influence agency choices either ex ante or ex post. 
On the front end, legislators erect legal frameworks for agency action and im-
pose mandatory duties.256 After the fact, they employ the committee oversight 
and annual appropriations processes to nudge or shove agencies.257 The relative 
strength of presidential and congressional influence is much debated. Early 
scholarship underscored congressional influence.258 More recent work subjects 
the congressional dominance thesis to theoretical critique259 and empirical  
 
255. Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: 
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic 
Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 120 
(1996). 
256. It has long been clear that Congress can impose nondiscretionary duties on federal 
officials in a way that precludes presidential overrides. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. 
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838) (holding that a writ of mandamus was available 
directing the postmaster general to release a sum of money that Congress had by special 
statute ordered paid, but that the President had directed be withheld); see also Henry P. 
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1983) 
(describing consistent usage of mandamus to regulate nineteenth-century administration). 
257. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Temporary Accidents?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 
1023-24 (2008) (book review) (“Politicians can control the bureaucrats—by, for instance, 
controlling the bureaucrats’ budgets or jurisdiction, which bureaucrats want to maximize—
and hence make sure that agencies deliver on the promises made in the legislation.”). I 
believe that Magill’s statement here has most force with respect to legislators.  
258. The theory of legislative dominance of agencies was originally set forth in a series 
of articles by Mathew McCubbins and collaborators. See Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. 
McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 589 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures 
as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins 
& Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire 
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).  
259. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional 
Dominance,’ 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475 (1987). 
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assault.260 Whatever the precise balance of interbranch control, the literature 
makes it clear that some mix of congressional and presidential influences im-
pinges on the bureaucracy.261  
Beyond electoral channels, the public also acts directly upon federal agen-
cies by lobbying and invoking interests in notice-and-comment rulemaking or 
adjudication. Both notice-and-comment requirements in federal rulemaking and 
statutory provision for judicial review of agency action create opportunities for 
the public to influence agency actions. These opportunities are more readily ac-
cessible to some interest groups than others. Scholars have long disagreed 
about how to characterize the resulting effects on agencies’ deliberations. Some 
invoke concern about agency capture by private groups.262 Fears of agency 
capture date from the late 1960s, and reflect broader “populist” critiques of the 
federal government.263 Other scholars put a more optimistic gloss on private 
influences on administrative agencies. They contend that agency officials are 
selected and subjected to demands for rational action through statutory con-
straints in ways that conduce to public-regarding actions.264 They argue that 
information acts as a “currency of administrative decisionmaking” so as to mit-
igate the collective action problems that enable capture.265 And, they argue, ju-
dicial review “level[s] the interest-group playing field.”266 However this debate 
is resolved, its participants agree that nonelectoral channels provide the public 
with some opportunities to influence policy outcomes.267 
 
260. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical 
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 824 (2003). 
261. See, e.g., Hammond & Knott, supra note 255, at 120 (emphasizing interactions 
between different mechanisms of popular control). 
262. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (describing agency capture in terms of 
administrative catering to the regulatory needs of the best-organized interest groups).  
263. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1039, 1050-51 (1997). 
264. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF 
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 92-96 (2008) (arguing that administrators are not 
beholden to Congress and generally have benign or public-regarding motivations); id. at 96-
101 (contending that institutional structures conduce to desirable outcomes through the mix 
of legislative and executive control levers); see also Robert B. Reich, Public Administration 
and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1620 (1985) (describing 
an interest group representation model in which administrators are “accessible to all 
organized interests while making no independent judgment of the merits of their claims”); 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1670 (1975) (describing a shift in administrative law to “the provision of a surrogate 
political process to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in the 
process of administrative decision”). 
265. CROLEY, supra note 264, at 135-36 (italics and capitalization omitted). 
266. Id. at 140. 
267. Yet another channel for public influence is the judiciary. “[I]ncreasing the 
lawmaking power of courts will . . . encourage interest groups to invest more resources in 
litigation,” thus reproducing the distortive effects of political inequality in the outcomes of 
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The availability of both electoral and nonelectoral channels for public in-
fluence on agencies complicates and ultimately compromises the equation of 
presidential control and democratic accountability. Most importantly, drawing 
attention to these channels illuminates a fallacy of composition in treating pres-
idential control as equivalent to democratic control. A fallacy of composition is 
a mistaken assumption that “if the components of an aggregate or members of a 
group have a certain property, the aggregate or group must also have that prop-
erty.”268  
Here, it is a mistake to assume that absent presidential control of an agen-
cy, any connection between public preferences and policy actions will be sev-
ered. A move from a baseline of limited to broad presidential control might in-
stead leave the quantum of democratic influence unchanged if the public 
viewed Congress and the executive as substitutes.269 To see this, consider the 
aftermath of a judicial decision that reallocates control of the administrative 
agencies from Congress to the White House. Observing such a decision, a ra-
tional, informed member of the public will understand that the 
intragovernmental distribution of bureaucratic control has changed. Incorporat-
ing her evaluation of the agency’s actions into choices at the ballot box, the 
voter will assign those actions less weight in casting a congressional ballot and 
more weight in casting a presidential ballot.270 The net effect of the initial court 
decision, as a result, may be a shuffling of the reasons for which voters cast 
congressional and presidential ballots. But it will not yield a change in the 
overall strength of the signal received by elected actors concerning agency ac-
tions. Rather, the effect of judicial intervention is to shuffle around accountabil-
ity without increasing its net quantum.  
To focus on the public’s voting behavior may strike some as implausible. 
Given the public’s impoverished knowledge about politics, perhaps this claim 
rests on unrealistic assumptions.271 Even if the public cannot respond in a  
nuanced way to judicial decisions, though, legislators may nevertheless act  
 
judicial review. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive 
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 71 (1991).  
268. VERMEULE, supra note 140, at 9. For instance, “it is a fallacy of composition to 
assume that because each lawmaking institution is undemocratic, taken individually, 
therefore the overall system that arises from their interaction must be undemocratic.” Adrian 
Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 6, 33 (2009). 
269. This is an application of the principle that “strategies depend on the strategies of 
others.” JERVIS, supra note 182, at 44 (italics and capitalization omitted). 
270. This assumes that voters can combine a heterogeneous bundle of policy 
preferences into a much smaller number of votes. For the purpose of this argument, I take 
this as given. But see infra Part III.B (exploring the effects of bundled preferences in voting).  
271. Of course, if you are skeptical that voters are sufficiently informed to make 
judgments about discrete agency actions in the first place, it is not clear why the project of 
enhancing democratic accountability over bureaucratic actions is a worthwhile project at all. 
That is, if voters’ actions at the ballot box are a function of some epistemically 
undernourished gestalt view of the nation’s conditions, why bother building hierarchical 
channels of accountability within the executive in the first place?  
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strategically to undermine the desired effect of judicial intervention. After a  
judicial decision assigning more control of agencies to the President, for  
example, legislators’ incentives to expend effort gathering information and in-
fluencing an agency are diminished because they cannot plausibly claim credit 
for the latter’s decisions. They therefore allocate less time and energy to agency 
oversight and control. At election time, they emphasize alternative accom-
plishments and goals. The public hence not only loses a means of bureaucratic 
control, but also ceases to benefit from the informational effect of congression-
al campaigns. The marginal cost of learning about agency actions rises, and 
there is no reason to believe that interest groups, or other substitute monitors, 
will step in to fill the gap.  
But perhaps even this account is excessively optimistic. It assumes legisla-
tors respond to increased presidential control of agencies with a precisely cali-
brated reduction of effort devoted to influencing agencies. But it is possible, 
even likely, that legislators will overcompensate for judicial intervention. They 
may reason that a high-salience decision from a federal court assigning more 
control to the President crowds out public awareness of residual congressional 
control. Such crowding-out may de facto absolve legislators of public-
regarding responsibility for wise use of their appropriations and oversight au-
thorities. The executive instead bears the full weight of public anger or appreci-
ation for agency actions, while rational legislators assign no further time or ef-
fort to agency supervision. This may be especially undesirable if, as noted 
above, an official’s possession of removal authority does not conduce to perfect 
control.272 If the gain from stronger presidential control is less than the loss 
from legislative slacking, the net consequence of a judicial decision assigning 
removal authority to the President may be a weaker—not a stronger—link be-
tween public preferences and agency actions.273  
Formal political science models of congressional-executive competition for 
agency control confirm the significance of interaction effects. Graphical, spatial 
models can be used to explore the effects of a decision to shift from exclusive 
congressional control of agencies to a situation of joint control. By analyzing 
the shift from a single principal to multiple principals in spatial terms, one such 
model identifies precisely the changing scope of agency discretion. It shows 
that a move from a single principal to multiple principals who must concur in 
an agency decision will often leave the agency with more policy freedom.274 
 
272. See supra Part II.B. 
273. In essence, this is a team production problem, which arises when multiple agents—
here, both Congress and the executive—are assigned a single task. See Armen A. Alchian & 
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. 
REV. 777, 779-81 (1972) (defining the team production problem). 
274. KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND 
INSTITUTIONS 425-28 (2d ed. 2010) (illustrating graphic model spatially). This is a kind of 
“empty core” phenomenon. See Tracey E. George & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., How Is 
Constitutional Law Made?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1270 n.21 (2002) (“A bargaining 
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The intuition, simply stated, is that when one principal can veto the other, there 
is a space created in which the agency has discretion to make policy choices in 
between the principals’ ideal points. The wider the gap between the policy 
preferences of the two principals, the more discretion an agency will have. In 
this way, it is quite possible that installation of presidential removal power will 
generate more, not less, agency insulation from political control. The sole way 
for courts to remedy this unintended effect would be to eliminate congressional 
influence entirely—which they cannot realistically do. At minimum, Congress 
always has a power to “pass legislation inimical to the agency,” a power that 
has been shown to influence agency actions.275  
Other models of the political control of agencies draw attention to the im-
portance of intertemporal effects. For example, consider a dampening mecha-
nism somewhat akin to the one described in Part II.B.2. Over time, it is inevita-
ble that the public’s policy preferences can move in and out of sync with those 
of elected actors. If this happens, agency insulation can produce policy out-
comes closer to public preferences than exclusive presidential control of agen-
cies.276 A gap between elected officials’ preferences and those of the public can 
emerge for many reasons, including demographic changes to the electorate, ex-
ogenous policy shocks, or learning by a new executive. Anticipating this drift, 
the electorate may rationally prefer to limit presidential influence on the admin-
istrative state because “bureaucratic insulation biases the expected policy away 
from the median voter’s ideal [and at the same time] reduces the variance in 
outcomes relative to what would occur under absolute presidential control.”277 
This variance-dampening effect of bureaucratic insulation can over time induce 
a closer match of policies to public preferences than perfect presidential con-
trol.278  
There is a further intertemporal wrinkle in the mechanisms of bureaucratic 
control. Agencies typically implement laws enacted not by the sitting Congress, 
but by earlier Congresses. Despite the inertial drag from incumbency-favoring 
gerrymanders in the House, it remains the case that the House and Senate do 
change compositions biannually. As a result, the median member of an enact-
ing legislature almost certainly has divergent preferences from the median 
member of the later Congress that is capable of overseeing and funding an 
 
situation requiring a majority agreement contains an empty core when a participant may be 
persuaded to defect from an agreement by the offer of a bigger share and such defection 
changes the majority agreement.”). 
275. Charles R. Shipan, Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional 
Nature of Congressional Influence, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 467, 467, 475 (2004).  
276. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 53, 55 (2008). 
277. Id. at 94.  
278. Cf. id. (“The majoritarian interest in strong presidential control is stronger when 
expected presidential responsiveness to majoritarian preferences is stronger, when political 
parties are less polarized, when bureaucratic preferences are more distant from majoritarian 
preferences, and when the majority’s political interests change relatively rapidly.”).  
HUQ 65 STAN. L. REV. 1.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2012 10:17 AM 
58 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
agency’s ongoing implementation of a law. Two distinct versions of the pub-
lic’s legislative representatives therefore have plausible claims upon agency fi-
delity. Normative and positive accounts of legislation tend to diverge on which 
one matters more. Most normative theories of statutory interpretation assume 
that the deal struck by the enacting Congress is dispositive of a law’s mean-
ing.279 Positive accounts of congressional control of the bureaucracy by con-
trast tend to focus on a present-day, not a historical, Congress.280 To be sure, 
the two versions of Congress may not conflict if earlier legislators, aware of the 
potential for “coalitional drift,” construct institutional frameworks to insulate 
agencies “against undoing” the work of an enacting coalition.281 But it is diffi-
cult for an enacting Congress to insulate wholly an agency from later legislative 
influences. Empirical studies show that as the legislative coalitions behind laws 
decay, Congress becomes increasingly likely to reduce spending on the law’s 
implementation, to modify its substance, or to do away with a regulatory pro-
gram entirely.282 Intertemporal tension is, for all practical purposes, inevitable.  
Decisions such as Free Enterprise Fund intervene in this intertemporal 
competition by favoring contemporary over former generations of officials in a 
way that favors policy flux over policy stability. While there will be occasion 
on which a President involved in enacting a law does remain in office during its 
enactment, in most cases, including Free Enterprise Fund, the White House 
will have changed hands by this point. The new administration likely has dif-
ferent views about a law’s implementation from the enacting White House. The 
new administration also has a relatively free hand in interstitial statutory con-
struction, and so can peel away from all but the clearest instructions embedded 
in legislation’s text.283 Viewed from this perspective, amplifying presidential 
control through an award of removal power is revealed to be simply a redistri-
bution of political control from past political coalitions to presently enfran-
chised representatives. It may also lead to a switching out of relatively durable 
policies in favor of more frequently fluctuating policies. To be sure, there may 
 
279. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 219-31 (2d ed. 2006) (describing intentionalist theories of statutory 
interpretation); see also id. at 231-45 (describing textualist theories). 
280. See, e.g., Hammond & Knott, supra note 255, at 145; McCubbins et al., supra note 
1, at 431; Shipan, supra note 275, at 475. 
281. SHEPSLE, supra note 274, at 436 (italics and capitalization omitted). 
282. Christopher R. Berry et al., After Enactment: The Lives and Deaths of Federal 
Programs, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1, 10-13 & tbls.1-2 (2010) (reporting regression studies of the 
predictors of program “mutation,” “death,” and fiscal support, and finding changes in 
enacting coalition presence in Congress to have the strongest effect). 
283. Chevron deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous laws in part rests on a 
theory of presidential accountability to the public. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). At issue in Chevron was the Reagan 
Administration’s interpretation of the statutory term stationary “source,” which was sharply 
at odds with the Carter Administration’s views of the law. Id. at 857-58. Hence, the result in 
Chevron itself ratified an interpretive change motivated by turnover in the Oval Office. 
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be reasons to favor current “enactable preferences” over previously enacted 
preferences.284 It may even be that some of those reasons have a democratic 
pedigree. But it is not clear why Article II should be read to endow present 
democratic factions with maximal ability to alter past democratic majorities’ 
hard-won statutory accomplishments.285  
It is possible to imagine responses to these interaction effects arguments. 
First, it could be argued that the presidency plays an “offsetting”286 representa-
tional function if congressional committees, which exercise the lion’s share of 
oversight and appropriations authority, are especially vulnerable to capture by 
regionally concentrated interests from “the so-called Farm State Lobby [and] 
the Tobacco Growers Lobby [to] the Rust Belt Lobby.”287 Presidential control, 
on this account, injects a revivifying nationalist perspective into agency 
decisionmaking that negates the corrosive influence of congressional commit-
tees.288 Second, presidential control might mitigate agencies’ tendency to over-
regulate when “regulation tends to favor narrow, well-organized groups at the 
expense of the general public,” a dynamic that is claimed to arise with, for ex-
ample, environmental advocacy groups.289  
These defenses of presidential control improve considerably on the 
acontextual analysis of Free Enterprise Fund. They take seriously the complex 
institutional ecosystem in which the White House interacts with agencies. But 
they are not, in my view, sufficient to redeem the claim that presidential control 
reliably translates into greater public influence. As a threshold matter, such de-
fenses are selective in their use of political science data. For example, a jaun-
diced perspective of congressional committees as engines of tawdry redistribu-
tive politics is incomplete. Recent work in political science shows that 
congressional committees in fact serve multiple roles. They are consciously de-
signed as “counterweight[s] to executive branch policy making.”290 They also 
play an “informational” function of enabling “informed decision making along-
 
284. Cf. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR 
LEGISLATION 23-38 (2008) (defending a judicial goal of “maximizing enactable preferences” 
in statutory interpretation). 
285. Indeed, consider a moral hazard argument to the effect that enabling lower-cost 
policy change diminishes the ex ante incentives for Congress to enact durable legislation. 
Rather than accountability, the result would be legislative stagnation. 
286. VERMEULE, supra note 140, at 51 (emphasis omitted).  
287. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 23, 85 (1995) [hereinafter Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments]; see also 
Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled 
Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1703 (2009) (exploring the problem of agency capture).  
288. Cf. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 287, at 85-86 (“When it 
comes to policy implementation, the national check must come from the President of the 
United States and his closest and most trusted aides.” (emphasis omitted)). 
289. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080-81 (1986). 
290. David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Legislative Organization Under Separate 
Powers, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 373, 373 (2001). 
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side distributional conflict.”291 If committees do have these positive, non-rent-
seeking functions, it cannot be assumed that presidential control should be 
promoted as a means of negating wholly their influence.292  
The claim that Congress takes a parochial view while the White House 
adopts the national view is also empirically fragile. To be sure, early presiden-
tial elections did generate “presidential-vice presidential pairs balanced by ge-
ography.”293 But the structure of the Electoral College may now force Presi-
dents to focus on a small number of specific, geographically distinct 
constituencies, which may or may not have views close to the national mean.294 
It is also difficult to predict in advance whether the median voter in the median 
federal legislative election is closer or farther from the national median voter 
than the median Electoral College voter.295 The claim that Presidents are nec-
essarily nationally representative is further undermined by the fact that only a 
slice of the eligible electorate casts votes in presidential elections.296 Presiden-
tial boosters must prove, not simply assume, the superior democratic creden-
tials of their institutional favorite. 
The second defense of presidential control as a cure for agency capture also 
rests on fragile empirical and theoretical ground. To begin, the literature’s 
claims of agency capture by proregulation organizations are “wholly implausi-
ble” as a political economy matter.297 Moreover, regulation perceived as the 
 
291. KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 122-23 (1991); 
see also Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of Congressional 
Institutions, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 149, 158-59 (1994) (describing Krehbiel’s model as a 
correction to earlier exclusively demand-side models of committee functioning). 
292. Cf. KREHBIEL, supra note 291, at 247-48 (concluding that the description of 
congressional committees as composed of “high-demanders”—that is, legislators whose 
preference intensities are higher for the issues within the committee’s jurisdiction, and who 
tend to be ideological outliers—is “probably not true”). 
293. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 150 (2005). 
294. See Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial 
Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1235-38 (2006). 
295. Cf. id. at 1238-39 (exploring possible differences between presidential and median 
legislator preferences). That said, one recent study finds little partisan bias in the Electoral 
College. DAVID R. MAYHEW, PARTISAN BALANCE: WHY POLITICAL PARTIES DON’T KILL THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 20 fig.1.2 (2011). Mayhew’s analysis shows a surprisingly 
tight connection between vote shares nationwide and in the median state, the median House 
district, and the median Electoral College unit. This analysis suggests that Congress and the 
President will not offset each other’s preferences, although it leaves on the table arguments 
about the distorting effect of committees. 
296. Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, 
Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 385 (2010) 
(“In recent decades, the successful [presidential] candidate has won the presidency on the 
votes of, on average, fewer than 30% of adult Americans.” (emphasis omitted)).  
297. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1286-87 (2006). For a recent and comprehensive 
debunking of the DeMuth-Ginsburg claim that pro-regulatory groups dominate Capitol Hill, 
see KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY 
CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
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outcome of capture can be observationally equivalent to interest-group-neutral 
“consumer” regulation.298 Posited examples of capture may thus not show 
countermajoritarian interest group politicking but instead reasonable regulation. 
Even when an interest group does capture an agency or a committee, this is not 
necessarily countermajoritarian. It may instead be a case of a “politically as-
tute” enacting Congress “cho[osing] structural features” to support a particular 
interest group’s agenda.299 If Congress intended to facilitate an interest group’s 
dominance in this way, it is hard to see the offense against democracy. Con-
cerns about capture finally assume a baseline of appropriate interest group in-
fluence against which “improper” instances of influence are gauged. As the Su-
preme Court has explained in the campaign finance context, though, it is not 
clear the Constitution supplies a normative baseline for this enterprise.300 Thus, 
even if it is the case that concentrated and capital-rich interest groups do have 
influence out of proportion to their numerosity in the electorate,301 it is not 
clear this is constitutionally troublesome given current First Amendment doc-
trine.302 Absent some stronger theory of democracy that the Constitution as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court appears to warrant, it is not clear why unfet-
tered presidential control can be defended on capture-related grounds.  
The claim that presidential control offsets agency bias also assumes that 
the White House is less vulnerable to lobbying and “capture” than either agen-
cies or congressional committees. But it is not clear this is so.303 Intense inter-
est group lobbying of the presidency has been a staple of national political life 
since the New Deal.304 The White House has even created an Office of Public 
 
19-20, 265-446 (2012) (documenting comprehensively the power of wealth and business 
lobbies). 
298. See Daniel P. Carpenter, Protection Without Capture: Product Approval by a 
Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 613, 613 (2004). 
299. See Moe, supra note 141, at 267, 288 (discussing commissions created during the 
New Deal). 
300. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 922 & n.2 
(2010) (rejecting equality-based grounds for campaign finance regulation); accord Davis v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 740, 744 (2008). 
301. Empirical studies of which social groups are represented in the Beltway have been 
confirming this premise for more than a half-century. See, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & 
JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 171-72 (1986); E.E. 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 35 (1960) (“The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with 
a strong upper-class accent.”).  
302. To be clear, I take no position on this normative question here; nor do I take a 
position here on whether current doctrine is incorrect. 
303. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 297, at 1305 (“Like any elected official, the 
President will be particularly attentive to those groups that can provide him with the 
resources, support, or votes to win elections or promote his political agenda.”). 
304. John Orman, The President and Interest Group Access, 18 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 
787, 787 (1988) (endorsing the idea that “interest group activity to lobby the President has 
become a virtually permanent feature of the modern presidency since Franklin Roosevelt” 
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Liaison to interact with interest groups.305 The result, unsurprisingly, is not 
equal access for all voices across the political spectrum, but differential access 
for favored voices.306 Equally problematic for the offsetting claim is the White 
House’s lack of transparency. The relative obscurity of some kinds of White 
House action, for instance through channels such as OIRA, may lower the 
transaction costs of presidential capture as opposed to committee capture.307 
Substantiating that concern, a recent study of a decade’s worth of OIRA actions 
found that “65 percent of the 5,759 meeting participants who met with OIRA 
represented regulated industry interests—about five times the number of people 
appearing on behalf of public interest groups.”308 This finding (and others) led 
the authors of that analysis to conclude that OIRA review is “a highly biased 
process that is far more accessible to regulated industries than to public interest 
groups.”309 Another study of White House influence on the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, for example, found the President “intervened on behalf of 
regulated entities more often than environmental interests.”310 The same study 
also reported that “White House involvement seldom was transparent to the 
public.”311  
Empirical evidence, in sum, does not support the claim that presidential 
control of agency action will have a prodemocracy offsetting effect. Rather, as 
the critics of President Obama’s czars and Vice President Cheney’s energy task 
force have alleged from different sides of the political aisle, presidential control 
 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see Neil Scott Cole, Pursuing the President: White 
House Access and Organized Interests, 37 SOC. SCI. J. 285, 290-91 (2000). 
305. Heath Brown, Interest Groups and Presidential Transitions, 38 CONGRESS & 
PRESIDENCY 152, 154 (2011). 
306. See, e.g., Mark A. Peterson, The Presidency and Organized Interests: White House 
Patterns of Interest Group Liaison, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 612, 617-18 (1992) (finding that 
twenty-eight percent of organizations with very conservative views on the provision of 
federal services had frequent access to the Reagan White House, compared to only four 
percent of groups with very liberal views). 
307. Hence, the claim that “the President is highly visible” and thus not vulnerable to 
capture, Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 287, at 86, is premised on a 
clearly erroneous assimilation of all White House action into the single person of the 
President.  
308. RENA STEINZOR ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 
AT THE WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS TRUMPS PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKER 
SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 8 (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/OIRA_Meetings_1111.pdf.  
309. Id. at 5.  
310. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 179, at 52. But see id. at 88 (“Although the 
White House sought parochial results, it nevertheless served a nationalizing role.”). Because 
Bressman and Vandenbergh rely on agency officials’ subjective perceptions in respect to this 
question, rather than on their knowledge of objective extrinsic facts, it is not clear whether 
this last result is endogenous to normative expectations of the presidency as the locus of 
“national” interests.  
311. Id. at 82. 
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can be just as pernicious, just as corrupting, and just as inconsistent with de-
mocracy as anything an agency or congressional committee does.  
 
*   *   * 
 
To summarize, presidential control is necessarily exercised in a complex 
institutional environment. Its interactions with other democratic mechanisms 
can generate both static and intertemporal interaction effects that undermine 
any tight nexus between White House control and democratic accountability. 
The effect of increasing presidential control on policy outcomes is therefore 
uncertain before the fact.  
B. Presidential Control as a Democratic Accountability Mechanism  
Aside from interaction effects, does presidential control provide a reliable 
mechanism for the transmission of the public’s preferences? As originally 
drafted, the Constitution does not compel a positive response. The 1787 text 
required no popular vote for the Electoral College.312 It was the states that 
fixed on popular vote mechanisms to pick electors.313 The presidency’s demo-
cratic credentials hence rest on subconstitutional foundations, not Article II. 
But even taking for granted the enfranchising nature of presidential selection, 
there remain three reasons for skepticism about claims of a strong causal con-
nection between presidential control and democratic accountability.  
The first ground for concern picks up on a theme raised in the previous 
Subpart: presidential influence on agency actions is not necessarily observable 
to the public314 and therefore does not necessarily provide a foundation for ret-
rospective voting. Interactions between the White House and agencies are rare-
ly exposed to public view. A subclass of these contacts is insulated by execu-
tive privilege.315 Other forms of presidential influence may be especially hard 
to discern. When the White House signals to agencies that they should not 
regulate, for example, the public may find it hard to distinguish the resulting 
 
312. Moreover, the Constitution slants representation in favor of small states and thus 
diverges seriously from a majoritarian benchmark. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each 
State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of 
Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may 
be entitled in the Congress . . . .”).  
313. States had largely adopted popular vote systems by 1804. AMAR, supra note 293, 
at 152. 
314. Cf. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 179, at 52 (arguing for increased 
transparency with respect to White House involvement in agency decisionmaking). 
315. See MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 19-53 (2d ed., rev. 2002) (developing case for executive privilege).  
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inaction from an agency’s refusal to regulate on policy grounds.316 Even when 
White House influence is overt, Presidents have means to diffuse accountabil-
ity. In consequence, the December 2011 decision to override the FDA’s per-
mission of emergency sales of Plan B One-Step contraceptives to those under 
seventeen was made public by Secretary of Health and Human Services Kath-
leen Sebelius, not the President.317 Rather than embracing a policy, the White 
House presented it so as to obfuscate, at least somewhat, its potential political 
roots. Just as “presidential administration” enables the White House to take 
ownership of issues, so technologies of presidential persuasion can be em-
ployed to raise information costs for the public.  
The second problem with aligning presidential control with democratic ac-
countability is the assumption that the presidential ballot provides an adequate 
mechanism for the expression of voters’ preferences on an unfettered range of 
federal administrative actions. The logic of Free Enterprise Fund assumes that 
members of the electorate use the presidential ballot (assuming they reside in a 
contested state) to express views on a plenary range of past federal policies (as-
suming an incumbent is running). This claim runs into what might be called a 
“bundling” problem. Federal administration comprises a vast array of entities 
taking on an incalculable number of decisions each year on distinct policy 
questions. How can voters use a single quadrennial ballot to express prefer-
ences on that enormous range of policy decisions?318 As one political scientist 
has noted, “[i]n a multi-issue world congruence [between the interests of voters 
and the actions of elected representatives] is difficult to achieve and even to de-
fine.”319 Compounding the signaling problem, voters in the federal system 
must sift through the distinct contributions of legislators and the executive to-
ward discrete policy outcomes.320 Accounting for these epistemic capacity con-
straints, one scholar has argued that an alternative institutional regime in which 
legislative and executive functions are combined, but in which distinct policy 
 
316. The formally independent Consumer Product Safety Commission, for example, 
was pressured in the early 1980s to refrain from regulating cigarette lighters even though 
they were a “major cause of child deaths.” Foote, supra note 149, at 234. 
317. Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Overruled on Availability of After-Sex Pill, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 8, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/health/policy/ 
sebelius-overrules-fda-on-freer-sale-of-emergency-contraceptives.html. 
318. See Farina, supra note 296, at 383 (“Given the very large number of policy issues 
potentially within the President’s sphere of influence, and the need to choose between only 
two (very rarely, three) serious contenders, the real surprise would be if many reasonably 
informed voters could find a candidate whose bundle of policy positions corresponds 
perfectly to their own set of issue preferences.”); Rubin, supra note 177, at 2080 (noting that 
most agency decisions “are simply too fine-grained to become factors in an electoral 
campaign”); see also Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 324-26 
(2010) (developing the same point). 
319. BESLEY, supra note 131, at 173. 
320. Cf. Gersen, supra note 318, at 326 (“Presidential regimes tend to produce stronger 
incentives because institutional actors can be selected and sanctioned separately, conditional 
on different sources of information.”). 
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competencies are separately elected, may produce a more robustly democratic 
system.321 It is not necessary to go that far to conclude that the bandwidth of 
current presidential elections is insufficient to convey accurately complex 
views on plural, incommensurable, and simultaneous policy choices. Viewed in 
this light, presidential elections—even assuming away the distortive influence 
of the Electoral College—are hardly paradigmatic mechanisms for the promo-
tion of democratic accountability.  
But perhaps bundling is an illusory problem. Perhaps Presidents can simply 
respond to the variance in public preferences by “adjust[ing] the bundle of their 
positions over time as circumstances change” such that “relatively permanent 
minority positions on various issues will always enjoy periods where presiden-
tial power is friendly and periods where it is not.”322 This optimistic story is 
implausible. If presidential elections do not provide a sufficiently granular sig-
nal of public preferences, there is no reason to think that the White House has 
the necessary information to change course in line with voters’ preferences. 
Worse, presidential policy mutability may well sap accountability to the public. 
Such mutability means voters cannot be certain when casting their ballots that a 
candidate’s positions will remain stable when in office. Hence, the claim that 
presidential cycling over issues generates democratic fidelity in the long run 
cannot be sustained without large and empirically unsupportable assumptions 
about presidential sensitivity to latent public preferences—and even if the as-
sumption could be sustained, it would not unambiguously support the 
presidentialist case.323  
Third, to assert a causal linkage between presidential control and democrat-
ic accountability is to assume that voters cast their ballots on the basis of real-
ized federal policy choices rather than on exogenous variables or unreliable 
proxies for the chief executive’s performance. Many empirical studies, howev-
er, demonstrate that voters understand only poorly how to translate policy pref-
erences into voting choices.324 Ignorance is not spread evenly across the  
 
321. See id. at 328. This assumes voters have sufficient information to cast separate 
ballots on each different governance function. If they do, it is possible that unbundled 
elections will in effect constitute plebiscites of particularly interested subpopulations. Id. at 
342-44. This echoes the kind of selective participation observed in agency lobbying and 
rulemaking, although the different cost profiles of lobbying and voting may conduce to 
different distributional consequences in the two settings.  
322. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 287, at 68-69. 
323. This is a sort of “invisible-hand mechanism” that lacks any underlying mechanism 
to explain causation. See VERMEULE, supra note 140, at 16-17, 70 (discussing invisible-hand 
mechanisms).  
324. See, e.g., Richard R. Lau et al., An Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S. 
Presidential Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 395, 406 (2008) (finding that about one-quarter of 
voters cast ballots in a way that sends “a misleading message about the direction of their 
preferences”). Such voters, for example, might have preferences over outcome but not 
policies, and might be underinformed as to the optimal choice of policy given their preferred 
outcome. R. Douglas Arnold, Can Inattentive Citizens Control Their Elected 
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population but is “most likely to be found among those who arguably have the 
most to gain from effective political participation: women, blacks, the poor, and 
the young.”325 Uneven distributions of epistemic advantage will not conduce to 
the accurate transmission of general public preferences. Other empirical work 
finds voters engaging in “economic voting”: casting ballots on the basis of na-
tional economic indicators over which the White House has at best imperfect 
control.326 However partial presidential control over the national economy 
might be, that is, the public views the White House as an economic command 
center327 and accordingly evaluates candidates based on national economic per-
formance.328 Presidential voting patterns thus do not fully reflect noneconomic 
policies even as they disproportionately reflect economic trends.329 Under these 
circumstances, reliance on the presidential franchise as the sole channel of 
democratic accountability in the manner of the Free Enterprise Fund Court 
seems unwise.  
C. Unpacking Democratic “Accountability” 
The constitutional foundation for the Free Enterprise Fund syllogism is 
democratic accountability. The Court defines accountability parsimoniously as 
 
Representatives?, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 401, 402-06 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993). 
325. MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT 
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 177 (1996). 
326. See FIORINA, supra note 87, at 25-26 (noting the common perception that the 
electorate “treats elections . . . as referenda on the incumbent administration’s handling of 
the economy”); Daniel Eisenberg & Jonathan Ketcham, Economic Voting in U.S. 
Presidential Elections: Who Blames Whom for What, 4 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 
1 (2004) (stating that “[t]he incumbent party’s fortunes depend significantly on how the 
economy has performed recently”); Michael S. Lewis-Beck & Mary Stegmaier, Economic 
Determinants of Electoral Outcomes, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 183, 191-96 (2000) 
(summarizing studies that show “economic voting is a regular feature of US presidential 
elections”). But see David F. Damore, Issue Convergence in Presidential Campaigns, 27 
POL. BEHAV. 71, 88-90 (2005) (“While macro-level variables such as the state of the 
economy or presidential approval shape the context in which a campaign is occurring, these 
factors do not determine outcomes. Rather, elections are determined by the interplay 
between campaign strategy and the receptiveness of undecided voters to candidates’ 
messages.” (citations omitted)).  
327. Richard Nadeau & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, National Economic Voting in U.S. 
Presidential Elections, 63 J. POL. 159, 178 (2001). 
328. Michael B. MacKuen et al., Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and 
the U.S. Economy, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 597, 606 (1992) (concluding that the electorate 
responds with the sophistication of a banker, by “evaluating the president on the basis of an 
informed view of the nation’s economic prospects, rather than its current standard of 
living”). 
329. See Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, supra note 326, at 183 (noting that economic issues 
are generally weighted “more heavily” than other issues). Hence, noneconomic factors are 
not wholly crowded out. See Arthur H. Miller & Thomas F. Klobucar, The Role of Issues in 
the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 101, 108 (2003).  
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the public’s capacity to “pass judgment” on federal policy decisions at the bal-
lot box.330 But studies of institutional behavior show accountability to have 
more complex causes and to manifest in more diverse institutional ways. Ac-
countability, this literature suggests, cannot be reduced to the bare ability to 
“pass judgment” every fourth November. To rely on an impoverished concep-
tion of accountability may have the perverse result of diminishing the public’s 
ability to influence federal policy outcomes.  
As a threshold matter, Free Enterprise Fund does not crisply define the 
sort of democratic accountability it reads into Article II. This would not be a 
problem if the Constitution embodied a single principle of majoritarian ac-
countability. But it does not. Instead, the Constitution encompasses plural con-
ceptions of representation,331 including a majoritarian one and a deliberative, 
republican one.332 Early scholars of the administrative state also flagged “three 
overlapping accountability regimes: political accountability to elected officials; 
hierarchical or managerial accountability to administrative superiors; and legal 
accountability to individuals and firms through judicial review.”333  
More salient here, studies suggest that large institutions such as bureaucra-
cies respond to diverse and plural constituencies in complex ways that resist 
reduction to a single metric. To the contrary, the ample literature on organiza-
tional design underscores the need to treat accountability as “protean” in terms 
of how it is produced and how it is institutionalized.334 One recent study de-
fined accountability to include either external or internal constraints on an insti-
tution, and identified five potential causal mechanisms behind it: transparency 
(revealing information), liability (facing consequences for actions), controlla-
bility (limiting agency slack), responsibility (following ex ante rules), and  
 
330. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 
(2010). 
331. An example of such an argument is Rebecca Brown’s claim that the Constitution 
demands not majoritarian democracy, but a form of oversight accountability that precludes 
abuse and corruption. See Brown, supra note 28, at 564-65. 
332. Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1564 (1988). For contrasting 
views, see AMAR, supra note 293, at 276-81 (arguing that the aim of the Guarantee Clause of 
Article IV was to “shore up popular sovereignty”); Richard A. Epstein, Modern 
Republicanism—Or the Flight from Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1639-43 (1988) 
(developing pluralist responses to republican claims). 
333. Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded 
Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1378 (2010) (citing FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 371-72 (1905)). 
334. Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the 
Project of Administrative Law, ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, art. 4, 2005, at 15, available at 
http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/Mashaw.IssuesinLegalScholarship.pdf; see also 
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 767-73 
(1997) (identifying different kinds of constitutional accountability).  
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responsiveness (meeting constituency demands).335 Accountability, that is, can 
be produced in several quite different ways. The choice between mechanisms 
may turn not on a deep theory of democracy, but more simply on the sort of 
goods an agency produces. For instance, an agency tasked with preserving the 
status quo might be best designed using ex ante rules and high transparency, 
while notice-and-comment regimes and reasoned-explanation demands may be 
a better fit for agencies tasked with responding to shifting constituency prefer-
ences. Depending on whether “predictability” or “change” is the desired goal, 
that is, designers of an agency must make “difficult trade-offs” about the ap-
propriate selection of accountability instruments.336 
Even if accountability is defined in purely majoritarian terms, the Court’s 
claim that such accountability is maximized by periodic presidential elections is 
at best incomplete. Studies of institutional accountability demonstrate that ra-
ther than being substitutes, the various mechanisms for eliciting accountability 
interact in ways that can either be complementary or conflictive. Consider the 
banal observation that transparency may be a prerequisite for effective public 
use of the ballot.337 This truism ignores the fact that transparency can also ren-
der officials more vulnerable to interest group capture, reducing their respon-
siveness to diffuse publics and generating new forms of agency slack.338 If in-
terest group capture is thought to make decisional transparency impractical, li-
liability rules may be a better instrument for attaining accountability. Treating 
electoral control as the single metric of accountability perilously ignores such 
interactive dynamics. 
Worse, an emphasis on a hierarchical control device such as an elective 
mechanism may generate perverse outcomes.339 The perils of hierarchical  
 
335. Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge 
of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder,” 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 94, 96 (2005); see also 
MELVIN J. DUBNIK & BARBARA S. ROMZEK, AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: POLITICS 
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS 76-77 (1991) (arguing that “[a]ccountability is 
another of those widely used terms that we hear so often and in so many different contexts 
that it is difficult to define,” but setting forth a four-part typology depending on whether 
accountability is internal or external and high or low intensity (italics omitted)); RICHARD 
MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 7-14, 
18-20 (2003) (noting that investigation, rectification, and ex post—but not ex ante—control 
are all elements of accountability); Rubin, supra note 177, at 2075 (identifying “hierarchy, 
monitoring, reporting, internal rules, investigations, and job evaluations” all as elements of 
accountability). 
336. Andrew B. Whitford, Adapting Agencies: Competition, Imitation, and Punishment 
in the Design of Bureaucratic Performance, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: 
FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY 160, 162 (George A. Krause & 
Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003).  
337. Cf. Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1751-53 
(2009) (discussing the connection between electoral accountability and transparency). 
338. See VERMEULE, supra note 184, at 183-200 (developing the costs of opacity 
through an examination of the federal budgetary process). 
339. Cf. Koppell, supra note 335, at 99 (suggesting that the imposition of multiple 
forms of accountability can conduce to undesirable outcomes). 
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control are illustrated by a study of the April 1996 military plane crash in which 
then-Commerce Secretary Ron Brown perished. This study identified the 
“complicated web of overlapping accountability relationships” as a central 
cause of the accident.340 It further identified a tension between responsiveness 
and potential liability—between “the rhetoric of a ‘can do’ mind set and a 
‘gotcha’ culture of accountability”—that generated “cross pressures of initia-
tive and command.”341 Strict hierarchical control induced intense pressure on 
the junior officers responsible for the flight plan to achieve results based on dif-
ficult-to-execute commands. Those junior officers made risky decisions, and 
then simply copied superior officers on e-mails to secure expeditious “authori-
zation.” The resulting volume of e-mails meant that senior officers rarely read 
or replied to e-mails. Junior officers took the absence of a countermanding re-
sponse to imply authorization rather than engaging in costly and time-
consuming verification.342 The result was catastrophic. More limited hierar-
chical control, which would not have flooded senior officers with information 
and which clearly vested junior officers with a more defined quantum of discre-
tion about certain risks, may have elicited better outcomes.343  
To be sure, elections do not operate like the military chain of command at 
issue in the Brown crash. There is no reason to expect the precise failure of 
communication seen in that incident to be repeated in the political context. But 
the foregoing analysis demonstrates that tight hierarchical control by a principal 
in some instances can generate perverse outcomes. In particular, it highlights 
the potential unintended effects of bundling accountability for many decisions 
into one channel that is vulnerable to bottlenecks. The result of such bottle-
necks can be the loss or distortion of crucial information. At a minimum, this 
shows that vertical hierarchical control does not always generate desirable out-
comes, and that its desirability must instead be evaluated on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Given the complexity and contingency of this inquiry, it is hard to see how 
the project of democratic accountability in the regulatory state is furthered 
through the sort of mechanical decision rules preferred by federal courts. Ra-
ther, democratic accountability may be best pursued by the political branches, 
which are more capable than the federal bench of solving the complex optimi-
zation problems implicated in institutional design decisions. 
 
*   *   * 
 
 
340. Barbara S. Romzek & Patricia Wallace Ingraham, Cross Pressures of 
Accountability: Initiative, Command, and Failure in the Ron Brown Plane Crash, 60 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 240, 242, 250 (2000). 
341. Id. at 249. 
342. Id. at 248. 
343. For a more general argument against the efficacy of vertical, command-and-
control forms of accountability, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 292-314 (1998). 
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This Part has critically examined the nexus between presidential control 
and democratic accountability and generated three results. First, interaction ef-
fects undermine the purported control-accountability link. Second, the causal 
nexus between presidential control and public preferences is weaker than the 
Supreme Court assumes. And third, studies of accountability suggest the 
Court’s identification of a single accountability-eliciting mechanism is incom-
plete. All three of these results bear directly—and negatively—on the purported 
causal linkage between presidential removal authority, White House control, 
and democratic accountability. Together, they affect a second rupture in that 
causal chain and generate yet another ground for predicting that the effects of 
the Free Enterprise Fund rule will be ad hoc and unprincipled.  
IV. THE REMOVAL POWER WITHOUT COURTS  
This Part applies the conclusions developed in Parts II and III to the 
justiciability question that lies at this Article’s heart. I argue here that the anal-
yses developed in the previous Parts demonstrate that presidential removal au-
thority does not generate a judicially manageable standard that enables effec-
tive promotion of democratic accountability. Hence, removal should be ranked 
as a political question. Having established this doctrinal conclusion, I explore 
its practical consequences and suggest that my proposal effects no large change 
in government ordering, even if it slices the feet from under a species of point-
less and needlessly baroque Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Recall first that in Part I, I canvassed the rather unsatisfying precedent con-
cerning the “judicially manageable standard” prong of the political question 
doctrine and suggested one minimal condition that judicially created rules of 
decision had to satisfy in order to rank as manageable: Does the rule produce 
results that are systematically correlated with its underlying constitutional justi-
fications? And are there judicially manageable standards? Perfect congruence, I 
have stressed, is not required. Instead, I accepted that arguments for 
nonjusticiability on unmanageability grounds had a higher burden of persuasion 
to meet. They had to show a more systematic absence of correlation between a 
rule and the values it putatively promotes.  
Removal fails to provide a reliable rule for the federal courts to employ in 
promoting democratic accountability because neither of the two causal claims 
upon which the Free Enterprise Fund syllogism rests can withstand analysis. 
First, as Part II demonstrated, the nexus between removal and presidential con-
trol is either weak or nonexistent. Even Presidents implicitly acknowledge as 
much by acceding without a murmur of complaint to the overwhelming majori-
ty of statutes creating agencies lacking at-will removal rules.344 Second, Part III 
developed reasons for concluding that democratic accountability is not secured 
through the promotion of presidential control. Put these conclusions together, 
 
344. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
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and it becomes clear that the Free Enterprise Fund rule of decision is not mere-
ly under- or overinclusive. It is instead wholly unreliable as a tool for attaining 
democratic accountability. Any specific judicial intervention in favor of presi-
dential removal authority might (1) increase democratic accountability, (2) de-
crease democratic accountability, or (3) leave that variable wholly unchanged. 
The positive, negative, or de minimis character of intervention’s effect de-
pends, inter alia, on (1) extraneous background design features of an agency, 
(2) the specific partisan political landscape at the moment of an intervention, 
and (3) the strategic responses of both other elected actors and also bureaucrats 
within an agency. In consequence, when a judicial decision affects more than 
one agency, it is likely that democratic accountability will be increased in some 
parts of the executive branch and decreased in other parts of the administrative 
state simultaneously. At least in some significant tranche of cases, judicial 
promotion of presidential removal authority will foster a false aura of White 
House control that conduces to misallocations of political responsibility. In the-
se cases, the Free Enterprise Fund rule undermines the constitutional good that 
the Court professes to be promoting. A court permitted to conjure up and en-
force rules of this kind, so untethered from their underlying justifications, is 
simply not a tribunal whose discretion is meaningfully bounded.  
Rather than “principled, rational, . . . reasoned distinctions,” judicial en-
forcement of presidential removal power will generate “inconsistent” or “ad 
hoc” results.345 Those results will predictably and inevitably “diverge . . . from 
the meaning of the constitutional guarantee” being implemented.346 It bears 
emphasis that what Parts II and III demonstrate is not a mere occasional slip-
page between rule and desired outcome—the problem here is of a quite differ-
ent order of magnitude. It is the pervasiveness and magnitude of the Free  
Enterprise Fund decision rule’s unpredictability, and courts’ inability to miti-
gate the problem, that distinguishes a removal-related rule from the mine run of 
judicial doctrines that have some variance—some under- and some 
overinclusiveness—in their consequences. Unlike those rules, a removal-
related rule is wholly ill-suited to its purported constitutional end. Accordingly, 
judicial rules that employ presidential removal power as a means to promote 
democratic accountability are within the heartland of the political question doc-
trine because they are not capable of principled and stable application through a 
judicially manageable standard. 
A subsidiary reason for ranking removal as a political question also emerg-
es from Parts II and III: the comparative epistemic advantage of the political 
branches as compared to federal judges in identifying when and how alloca-
tions of removal authority matter. On several occasions, I have touched on the 
fact that removal’s effects depend on political costs, the strategic responses of 
other political actors, relevant norms within bureaucratic institutions, and the 
 
345. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
346. Fallon, supra note 117, at 1284. 
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efficacy of other political instruments (such as the appointment power). There 
is every reason to expect that the political branches have information about the-
se factors that courts systematically lack. On this count, the Free Enterprise 
Fund Court’s tin ear to institutional context is instructive.347 Political actors’ 
nuanced and contextual understanding of the effect of control mechanisms sug-
gests that the design of agencies should be relegated to elected hands. That their 
institutional interests are directly implicated in such decisions only compounds 
the case for treating removal as a political question. It is also consistent with 
the Framers’ general strategy of hardwiring solutions to governance problems 
into the multipolar structure of the new American government, rather than rely-
ing on entitlements such as a presidential “right” to control removal.348 To the 
extent that agency design is influenced by strategic political calculation, this is 
simply consistent with the Framers’ general approach to constitutional design 
problems. And finally, if the Court’s ultimate goal is democratic accountability, 
it is hard to see why decisions about agency design should be insulated from 
democratic choice: there is no reason supplied in Free Enterprise Fund to be-
lieve that the electorate is incapable of observing and responding at the polls to 
wise or foolish design decisions.349 In short, the calculus of institutional inter-
est and insight also tilts in favor of treating removal as a political question. 
A possible counterargument to this position rests on the observation that 
elected officials might act strategically based on short-term political motives in 
ways that did not conduce to optimal structures. There are two responses to this 
point. First, it is up to the political branches to balance short-term goals—which 
are also part of the democratic calculus—with longer-term aspirations. Courts 
have no clear vantage point to second-guess legislative judgments of this sort, 
even with respect to institutional design decisions. Second, if voters disagree 
with how politicians strike a balance between short- and long-term interests in 
agency design, they can employ the ballot box to express their displeasure.350  
 
347. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
348. The separation of powers doctrine is famously predicated on the idea that “the 
great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, 
consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional 
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. . . . Ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 30, at 
321-22. I do not address here the ample literature criticizing Madison’s logic, but rather draw 
attention to the consistency of my position with the Framers’ general institutional design 
strategies. 
349. If Part III’s criticisms of democratic mechanisms are accepted, one might query 
whether the electorate will punish on the basis of bad agency design decisions either. The 
point here is that the Free Enterprise Fund Court’s assumption that solo presidential control 
conduces to democratic control is certainly not more reasonable than the assumption that 
agency design by Congress and the President, exemplified in the form of a publicly available 
statute, conduces to effective political control. 
350.  As noted previously, see supra note 271, if you are skeptical that voters are 
competent to do this, it is not clear why you would support the equally fine-grained 
democratic aspirations behind the Free Enterprise Fund rule. 
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To call off removal-related litigation is not to award the laurel to either 
Congress or the White House. Rendering removal nonjusticiable leaves the un-
derlying constitutional question to be resolved through contestation between 
democratically credentialed actors. What it does not do, however, is translate 
into any large immediate shift in either the doctrine or practice. Recall that the 
Court, with the exception of two brief periods of inconclusive intervention, has 
generally regulated congressional decisions concerning agency design with on-
ly a light touch.351 Cases such as Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor, where 
the Court has endorsed congressional limitations on presidential removal au-
thority, remain in effect good law. Challenges to those constraints would be 
dismissed as nonjusticiable with much the same end result. The only precedent 
that would be disturbed is Myers’s protection of “purely executive” offices.352 
Yet it is hardly clear what practical difference that would make, since—at least 
until Free Enterprise Fund—Myers has had scant generative influence upon 
federal court jurisprudence.353 As a result, it is worth emphasizing that under 
the instant proposal of nonjusticiability, matters of agency design would be re-
solved much as they are now—through informed and contextually sensitive ne-
gotiation between the political branches. The proposal’s most important conse-
quence may be to curtail a budding line of jurisprudence, nascent in Free 
Enterprise Fund, that promises much but that can deliver little or nothing by 
way of democratic accountability. Otherwise, the status quo remains basically 
unchanged.  
To see how the proposed nonjusticiability of removal would work in prac-
tice, it is helpful to notice that removal-related challenges arise in two distinct 
postures. First, a private litigant may lodge a pre-enforcement challenge to a 
federal statutory scheme on the ground that it does not conform to Article II’s 
prerequisites. Often that plaintiff will be potentially or currently subject to fed-
eral regulation. For example, the challenge to the PCAOB’s regulatory authori-
ty in Free Enterprise Fund arose before any enforcement action began,354 
while the challenge to the independent counsel statute was lodged in the midst 
of an investigation.355 A second possibility is that an issue of removal authority 
arises in litigation initiated by a disgruntled former official. Having been re-
moved from office, he or she might seek damages for the dismissal. The De-
partment of Justice would then resist the suit on the ground, inter alia, that Arti-
cle II rendered the dismissal constitutional notwithstanding the statutory 
 
351. See supra text accompanying notes 44-59. 
352. See Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 & n.28 (1988) (discussing this 
category in Myers). 
353. By contrast, Myers has proved a reliable source of academic conflict. No doubt, 
overruling it would do nothing but elicit yet more wrangling in the law reviews.  
354. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3149 
(2010) (describing plaintiffs’ pre-enforcement suit for declaratory and injunctive relief). 
355. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 667-69 (explaining that the case arose on the expedited 
appeal of a contempt order). 
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restraints on presidential removal authority. Both Myers and Humphrey’s  
Executor arose from this sort of postdismissal challenge.356  
In the first class of cases, nonjusticiability has the effect of eliminating ex 
ante challenges by regulated entities to agency actions. As Part I demonstrated, 
successful challenges on the basis of insufficient removal authority have always 
been few and far between. This means that elimination of this category of liti-
gation would, in practice, mean ousting Myers and a handful of other prece-
dent. Indeed, some might argue that it would be a positive service to extinguish 
the residual uncertainty about the scope of Myers and the opaque category of 
“purely” executive officials. As a practical matter, that decision would no long-
er be a free-floating license for the invention of new reasons to seek modifica-
tion of Congress’s agency design decisions through the courts. 
In the second class of cases, federal courts would simply not recognize a 
defense to liability based on Article II of the Constitution. The effect of this 
would be much the same as declining to recognize a defense to impeachment 
based on alleged procedural defects in the Senate’s actions.357 The refusal to 
treat a defense based upon nonjusticiability leaves a defendant in both cases 
with one less instrument in the toolkit to deflect a penalty. This would leave the 
operative rule of Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor in place. Under those 
cases, as under the rule proposed here, agencies could continue functioning 
notwithstanding any debate on their compliance with Article II. Just as at pre-
sent, if the President wishes to claim an Article II power of removal, he or she 
is able to do so, but at the cost of having to expend fiscal resources on back pay 
and litigation costs in a suit lodged by a dismissed officer.358 Whereas the first 
class of cases yields a victory for the executive, in the sense that it can continue 
to apply regulations unhindered by pre-enforcement challenges, in the second 
class of cases, the President loses, in the sense of having to pay something for 
broad assertions of Article II’s scope—much as it has to now.359 Given the in-
frequency of money judgments against the executive to date under a regime 
where good-cause removal has been pervasive, there is no reason to expect this 
to have a large fiscal impact.  
 
356. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618 (1935); Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926). It is worth noting that the President has, as a historical 
matter, both defended and attacked removal limits depending on the posture of the litigation. 
357. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-35 (1993).  
358. But injunctive relief against an executive branch official in the form of a 
reinstatement order would raise substantial constitutional issues. Cf. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 
677, 720 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting) (considering constitutional implications 
of the reinstatement remedy requested by the plaintiff). For the purposes of the present 
discussion, it is enough to say that dismissed employees seem reluctant to seek reinstatement 
and courts seem very unlikely to grant such relief. Indeed, I have found no ruling granting 
such relief.  
359. Nonjusticiability, as a result, would not result in merely an increase in presidential 
authority, as is the case with some other applications of the political question doctrine.  
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The net effect of nonjusticiability, in short, is to leave in place whatever 
statutory framework Congress and the President have already converged upon, 
while effectuating little change to the de facto doctrinal status quo. Importantly, 
this means that courts will enforce the political decisions embodied in statutes 
about agency design, decisions that voters can easily and reliably use as a guide 
for retrospective voting. And it is to avoid a situation in which voters must en-
gage in the epistemically complex process of reconciling statutory texts with 
disparate strands of Supreme Court jurisprudence and then making fine-grained 
judgments about the resulting balance of interbranch powers. For it is not at all 
clear how the latter situation—which Free Enterprise Fund invites—creates a 
more robust form of democratic accountability. 
It is not the case that eliminating Article III jurisdiction over questions of 
removal authority necessarily tilts the scales in favor of either the White House 
or Congress. Courts will enforce whatever arrangements Congress and the 
White House agree upon. There is no reason to think that a principle of respect 
for clear political settlements would favor either one branch or the other. Ra-
ther, the downstream effect of nonjusticiability will be a function of how much 
a President values removal authority over a given official, how aggressively 
Congress is willing to push for constraints on that power, and what kind of con-
stitutional norms crystallize via open political debate. Further, where a White 
House occupant believes that a limit on removal hinders his or her policy agen-
da—which, it is worth noting, is not the same as perceiving it as friction on 
democratic accountability—then the presidency has ample tools to influence 
Congress to change the rule or alternatively to exploit the flexibility implicit in 
even a just-cause regime.360  
Moreover, my proposal makes no implicit assumption about the agency de-
sign principle that Congress and the President will follow in the absence of ju-
dicial enforcement. At present, the observed ecology of federal agency struc-
tures contains a variety of different arrangements respecting removal authority 
and political control. There is no reason to believe that the political branches, in 
reaching these design decisions, are hewing mechanically to any implicit and 
unspoken understanding of Article II. Rather, they are making contextually in-
formed decisions about how best to serve democratic accountability, as well as 
many other vital policy goals such as impartiality and expertise, in light of 
knowledge about existing agency operations, the play of democratic forces, and 
the particular circumstances of a policy area. To be sure, these decisions may 
be inflected by strategic political concerns—but so too may almost any im-
portant decision respecting federal governance.361 My proposal conduces to ju-
dicial respect for the ensuing political branch decisions and does not imply any 
 
360. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
361. Consider in this regard Supreme Court appointments. No matter what Presidents 
claim, such appointments are not fairly described as reflecting only concerns about expertise 
and skill.  
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sub rosa agenda, rule, or principle for the settlement of those agency design de-
cisions.  
Nevertheless, the analysis developed in Parts II and III provides strong rea-
sons to believe that treating removal as a political question will also have no 
large effect on interbranch relations or bureaucratic practice. Most importantly, 
as Part II emphasized, chief executives already have a wide array of substitutes 
to removal as a means of control, many of which have lower transaction costs. 
If private employment contexts are any guide, the absence of an at-will em-
ployment rule also may well not make much difference to quotidian bureaucrat-
ic practice. Like private employers, political officials likely do better in any 
event eliciting desirable behavior through nonhierarchical means. 
Nonjusticiability and merits, in short, are acoustically separate when it 
comes to the removal question. There is no reason to repudiate application of 
the political question doctrine out of concern that it would de facto settle the 
underlying constitutional question or that it would have a destabilizing effect 
on current institutional arrangements. To the contrary, the historical fragility of 
judicial constructions of the removal power suggests any effect upon the 
interbranch equilibrium would be small in scale and hardly dispositive.  
CONCLUSION 
The primary claim of this Article is that allocations of removal authority 
should be considered political questions. To that end, this Article has analyzed 
the two-part syllogism at the foundation of Free Enterprise Fund and found 
neither link to be robust. Judicial enforcement of presidential removal authority 
is hence too erratic and unreliable a means of securing democratic accountabil-
ity to be ranked as a judicially manageable standard. The Article’s larger ambi-
tion is to demonstrate that agency design more generally is not an appropriate 
matter for judicial resolution. In particular, I have emphasized interaction ef-
fects and strategic responses to judicial interventions as grounds to think that 
the sort of simple decision rules preferred by courts will tend to fail. The feder-
al bench, in short, has no mandate for piecemeal meddling in agency design as 
a means for promoting majoritarian values. Democratic accountability is best 
promoted instead by leaving agency design to democratic choice. 
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